# Grapevine – 1NC – Rd. 5

### 1

Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

That means trade agreements, promotion, or loans and grants

Resnik, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

Violation – the plan only invests in the nanotech sector

Voting issue for limits and ground --- non-economic areas are huge, overstretch research burdens and require completely different strategies --- trade and finance allow sufficient flexibility but lock-in a core mechanism for preparation

### 2

#### The United States federal government should extend a tax credit of 39 cents for every dollar invested by business, non-governmental organizations, and individuals that substantially increase their nanotechnology assistance toward Mexico.

#### Tax credits solves the case – avoid corruption and bureaucracy

**Werker, 7**

(Professor-Harvard Business School, 10/20, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/opinion/20werker.html)

While foreign aid works in some situations, it is beset by two huge problems. First, there is never enough money to go around. Last year, the United States provided $23 billion of development aid to foreign countries. This was more than any other donor, but it still resulted in very little for the billion people who live on less than one dollar per day. The second problem is that the money that does get distributed doesn't always reach the people who need it. As Jeffrey Sachs has noted, of every dollar given to Africa, **only 44 cents is actually directed toward** economic **development.** The rest goes to debt service, consultants and humanitarian emergencies. And after those expenses are subtracted, the money that remains is further reduced by mismanagement and corruption. A solution to both problems would be to **give tax credits to American companies that invest in qualified developing countries**. A similar program that focuses on domestic poverty has been a resounding success. In 2000, Congress created $6 billion of tax credits for businesses that invest in poor communities within the United States. The theory was that the cycles of poverty and joblessness in poor communities could be ended only by the development of local businesses, not by an aid check. Seven years later, so many businesses want to invest in poor areas that only a quarter of the companies that applied for tax credits in 2006 received them. Using the domestic program as a template, **Congress should provide a 39-cent tax credit for every dollar of American investment in developing countries**. If General Electric were to build a $100 million factory in Madagascar, its tax bill would be reduced by $39 million. The lost revenue to government coffers would be offset by reducing direct foreign aid by the same amount. The power of substituting tax credits for lump sums of cash is that while the latter would bring at most $39 million to Madagascar, the former results in a $100 million investment. For the exact same cost to the federal government, Madagascar receives far more resources. And by leveraging its foreign aid dollars, the United States is better off too, for reasons ranging from the creation of new markets to alleviating conditions that may aid terrorist recruitment. Using tax credits instead of traditional foreign aid also means that the **money will be spent more prudently**. Because for-profit companies are focused on the bottom line, these companies will **by nature be more protective than government agencies** of the money they invest in developing countries. Developing countries themselves clamor for more foreign investment as a way to generate real economic development. They set up export promotion agencies and offer their own tax breaks to foreign companies. With $100 million in foreign investment from American companies, government officials in Madagascar could spend their time tackling other domestic problems. Moving from inefficient direct aid to investment tax credits **could lead to a fivefold increase in the capital** that is deployed in developing countries. Of the $23 billion the United States currently spends on foreign aid, less than half reaches the ground. Providing $23 billion in tax credits, on the other hand, would lead to $59 billion of investment, if the domestic formula is applied abroad. Of course, the private sector is not always efficient, and not all of the money allocated to foreign aid should be converted to tax credits. But by involving the private sector, the United States could significantly increase the amount of money we spend in poor countries, **without using any more taxpayer dollars**. A program of tax credits for private investment in developing countries could be structured to **reinforce goals other than economic growth**. The tax credits could be awarded to countries that embrace ''green'' development or good governance, providing an extra incentive for countries to achieve these goals. Eligibility could be restricted to new investment that generates jobs and transfers know-how to the poorest countries that do not compete directly with American workers.

### 3

#### China’s sphere of influence over Mexico high now – new agreements

**Zeal 6/5** (New, a reporter’s actual name, June 5, 2013, “The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a “Strategic Partnership” With Mexico,” http://beforeitsnews.com/opinion-conservative/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-china-enters-into-a-strategic-partnership-with-mexico-2657822.html)//DR.H

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other’s concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other’s core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other’s development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries, witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico and China are each other’s important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. “I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage,” he said. Latin America is rapidly becoming a Chinese sphere of influence. This latest development can only accelerate this unhealthy trend.

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 4

#### Obama has the upper hand on debt limit now but GOP demands could create a complicated battle

Kapur, 9/9 --- TPM’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent

(9/9/2013, Sahil, “Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?” <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php>)

House Republicans are taming members’ expectations ahead of the debt limit showdown, signaling that they may not be able to extract significant concessions from Democrats.

A Friday memo to GOP members by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) says “the House will act to prevent a default on our obligations before” the mid-October deadline the Obama administration has established. “House Republicans,” he says, “will demand fiscal reforms and pro-growth policies which put us on a path to balance in ten years in exchange for another increase in the debt limit.”

The language is vague — intentionally so, in order to maintain wiggle room for Republicans to avert a disastrous debt default. President Barack Obama has vowed not to pay a ransom to ensure the U.S. can meet its obligations.

If and when they do cave, Republicans will be hard-pressed to show their base they got something in return for raising the debt ceiling. In January, they got Senate Democrats to agree to pass a non-binding budget resolution. This time around, the possibilities for symbolic concessions range from a doomed Senate vote to delay or defund Obamacare or instructions to initiate the process of tax reform.

There are a number of demands rank-and-file Republicans have urged leaders to make which could genuinely complicate the battle, such as dollar-for-dollar spending cuts or unwinding Obamacare. Cantor’s memo mentioned neither. GOP members have also called on leadership not to bring up any debt limit bill that lacks the support of half the conference. Boehner hasn’t committed to this and Cantor didn’t mention it in his memo.

There are several reasons Republicans will have a hard time extracting concessions. Back in January, when Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, Republicans folded and agreed to suspend the debt ceiling without substantial concessions but rather symbolic ones. And due to deep divisions within the conference, House Republicans will face enormous challenges in rounding up 218 votes to pass any conceivable debt limit hike.

The party’s top priority is to cut safety-net programs like Social Security and Medicare. But there’s no internal consensus on what to cut. And Republicans, whose constituents are disproportionately older, have generally refused to vote on entitlement cuts without bipartisan cover from Democrats. In this case Democrats are highly unlikely to give it to them, which complicates their task of passing a debt limit bill.

The Cantor memo makes it all but official that Republicans won’t seek to defund Obamacare in the fiscal battles. The strategy, pushed by conservative activists, to withhold support for keeping the government running after Sept. 30 unless Democrats agree to defund Obamacare. Instead it vows to “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” The memo says Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”

The GOP’s big stand in the fiscal battles will be to force Obama to accept the lower spending levels ordered by sequestration — automatic spending cuts enacted in 2011 — in a measure to keep the government funded. Here Republicans will refuse to cede and the White House has not suggested it’ll veto a bill that maintains sequester spending levels, although Obama wants to cut a deal to replace the sequester.

“In signing a CR at sequester levels,” Cantor writes, “the President would be endorsing a level of spending that wipes away all the increases he and Congressional Democrats made while they were in charge and returns us to a pre-2008 level of discretionary spending.”

#### Calling in a favor on the plan burns up Obama’s limited leverage with House Republicans

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)>)

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.

There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

#### ( ) Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse

Lobello, 8/27 --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

**Independently, economic leadership prevents war—perception matters**

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### Status quo

Patenting flaws take out solvency

Foladori 06

(professor in the Doctoral Program on Development Studies, Universidad ¶ Autónoma de Zacatecas, México, Guillermo, “Nanotechnology in Latin America ¶ at the Crossroads”, [http://www.estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/administracion/docentes/documentos\_personales/193983\_2\_International\_138[1].pdf](http://www.estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/administracion/docentes/documentos_personales/193983_2_International_138%5b1%5d.pdf)//VS)

We live in a world where patents dictate the possibilities of use and enrichment. Nanotechnology ¶ patents are concentrated in the hands of wealthy countries and multinational corporations. ¶ In 2003, the five countries with the largest number of nanotechnology patents are as follows: the ¶ U.S. (5,228), Japan (926), Germany (684), Canada (244) and France (183). In addition, the five entities ¶ that obtained more patents related to nanotechnology included four multinational electronics companies ¶ and one university: IBM (198), Micron Technologies (129), Advanced Micro Devices (128), Intel (90) ¶ and the University of California (89).48¶ This means that the restructuring of industry on a worldwide scale will mean having to pay for new ¶ patents. In Argentina, as in Brazil and Mexico, the possibility that research into nanotechnology will lead ¶ to patents is one of the goals and economic arguments for investing in these new technologies. However, ¶ this is a two-edged sword. Even when new patents are registered, it is highly likely that the country as a ¶ whole will have to disburse much more for all the patents than it should pay for. This is a topic that has ¶ to be discussed in depth.

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**No solvency—alt causes**

**Amos 10** (Amy Mathews Amos, July 16, 2010, Amy Mathews Amos, “Killing Nemo and his Coral Home”, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/30778/, accessed: 7-16-10

But it’s not just fish populations that get destroyed. Coral reefs are structures produced by living organisms in oceans. The primary organisms typically are stony corals that secrete an exoskeleton of calcium carbonate, creating a reef that supports the corals and a huge variety of other animal and plant life. Divers often squirt cyanide into reefs to stun fish, making them easier to catch. Cyanide typically doesn’t kill the fish outright, but it does kill corals and other life on the reef. Divers also often pry corals apart to find fish hiding in crevices, destroying a reef structure that took decades or centuries to build. All of this comes at a time when corals can least afford it. Pollution and overfishing for food are major problems on these reefs. And corals are notoriously vulnerable to increases in water temperature and other effects of climate change. According to Tissot, the net effect of removing reef fish in such large numbers is that we are making coral reefs less able to handle stresses like global climate change. “Our best defense against climate change is a stable reef with an intact ecosystem. A reef that retains its own natural complexity will be more resilient to these changes.” The good news and the bad is that this destruction is driven largely by demand in the United States and Europe. Because we created most of the demand, we can also change it. According to Dr. Eric Borneman, a coral biologist at the University of Houston and an author on the aquarium hobby, “Just reducing the mortality rate would make a huge, huge difference.” He urges hobbyists to buy fish only from reputable businesses that source from responsible exporters that can trace their fish to its source. These businesses sell healthy fish that clearly have been handled well throughout their journey. Although they may be more expensive initially, the higher survival rates of these fish make them less costly because they don’t need to be replaced—and therefore don’t fuel demand for overfishing on coral reefs. He also urges hobbyists to learn “which fish are almost impossible to kill and which are almost impossible to keep alive” in captivity. Those that won’t survive in a tank should never be removed from a reef. Brian Plankis, president of the nonprofit Reef Stewardship Foundation, maintains, “Everyone can take action to help coral reefs, not just hobbyists.” He recommends reducing your personal carbon footprint by driving a more fuel-efficient vehicle, taking public transportation, and purchasing electricity from renewable sources. Ultimately, changes need to happen on the water in source countries to eliminate overfishing and cyanide use. But changing demand in the United States can help: without a market, there’s nothing to sell. Changes to U.S. import laws are needed to prevent unregulated or poorly managed fish from entering the country. Stricter shipping requirements to reduce the number of fish that die en route may also be necessary. In the meantime, keep rooting for Nemo. The future of the world’s coral reefs may depend on it.

**Species loss causes better-adapted species to evolve**

**Dodds, MS, 7** – MS in PE. President, North Pacific Research (Donald, The Myth of Biodiversity, http://northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc, AG)

Notice next that at least ten times biodiversity fell rapidly; none of these extreme reductions in biodiversity were caused by humans. Around 250 million years ago the number of genera was reduce 85 percent from about 1200 to around 200, by any definition a significant reduction in biodiversity. Now notice that after this extinction a steep and rapid rise of biodiversity. In fact, if you look closely at the curve, you will find that every mass-extinction was followed by a massive increase in biodiversity. Why was that? Do you suppose it had anything to do with the number environmental niches available for exploitation? If you do, you are right. Extinctions are necessary for creation. Each time a mass extinction occurs the world is filled with new and better-adapted species. That is the way evolution works, its called survival of the fittest. Those species that could not adapted to the changing world conditions simply disappeared and better species evolved. How efficient is that? Those that could adapt to change continued to thrive. For example, the cockroach and the shark have been around well over 300 million years. There is a pair to draw to, two successful species that any creator would be proud to produce. To date these creatures have successful survived six extinctions, without the aid of humans or the EPA. Now notice that only once in the last 500 million years did life ever exceed 1500 genera, and that was in the middle of the Cretaceous Period around 100 million years ago, when the dinosaurs exploded on the planet. Obviously, biodiversity has a bad side. The direct result of this explosion in biodiversity was the extinction of the dinosaurs that followed 45 million years later at the KT boundary. It is interesting to note, that at the end of the extinction the number of genera had returned to the 1500 level almost exactly. Presently biodiversity is at an all time high and has again far exceeded the 1500 genera level. Are we over due for another extinction? A closer look at the KT extinction 65 million years ago reveals at least three things. First the 1500 genera that remained had passed the test of environmental compatibility and remained on the planet. This was not an accident. Second, these extinctions freed niches for occupation by better-adapted species. The remaining genera now faced an environment with hundreds of thousands of vacant niches. Third, it only took about 15 million years to refill all of those niches and completely replaced the dinosaurs, with new and better species. In this context, a better species is by definition one that is more successful in dealing with a changing environment.

**Environment improving**

**Garte 9—**Director of CSR’s Division of Physiological and Pathological Sciences, DHHS. Was a professor at New York University Medical Center’s Department of Environmental Medicine and at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, School of Public Health. PhD, biochemistry (12/31/09, Seymour, “A decade of breathing easier; Once you cut through the gloom in the headlines, you'll see the air is cleaner, our health is better, and many endangered species have been recovering in the 00s,” Ottowa Citizen, Lexis, WRB)

The facts about where we are now compared to where we have been, can be found in my 2007 book, Where We Stand: A Surprising Look at the Real State of Our Planet. Thanks to the Bush administration, the last decade was probably the worst for environment and public health policy for quite some time. Despite that, the improvements that started in the 1970s have continued. Three (of the many) areas of continued improvement during the past 10 years are: air pollution, toxic exposures, and endangered species. Concentrations of the major toxic air pollutants have all declined in North America during the bad decade of the naughts. Carbon monoxide air levels are less than half what they were in 2000. Sulfur dioxide has decreased by one-third from what it was at the beginning of the decade. Particulates have decreased by 20 per cent, nitrogen dioxide by 30 per cent, and ozone by 15 per cent. What about carbon dioxide, the evil culprit behind global warming? We certainly know that CO2 emissions keep spiraling out of control, right? Well, no, wrong. Carbon dioxide emissions have been steadily declining in the past five years. We have heard a lot about body burdens of dangerous chemicals. The well-known journalist, Anderson Cooper, was found to contain a number of chemicals in his blood stream. Aside from the fact that the levels of such chemicals were tens or hundreds of times lower than minimum toxic doses, does this raise the question of a new and terrible trend of increasing chemical contamination of our bodies? In reality, the reverse is true. Our chemical body burdens have been decreasing consistently over time since the 1970s. Dieldrin is present in our blood at levels 10 times lower than it once was, PCBs are present from three to five times less and DDT is found at 15 times lower concentrations. The reason for these decreases is simple. We have been subject to much less chemical exposure than we were decades ago thanks to regulations prohibiting toxic chemical releases into the environment. The best example of this is lead. Since the ban on lead in gasoline and other products, lead in human blood has steadily declined to levels over 100 times less in 2000 than were found in the 1980s. And this decrease continued over the past decade, falling by another 35 per cent from 2000 to 2009. Everyone knows that biodiversity is doomed on the planet. We have been told that we are losing thousands of species every day. No one knows where this figure comes from, but it doesn't matter. Clearly we are wiping out all of our wildlife, and we are the relentless, uncaring engines of mass extinction. Actually, no, we are not. The heroic efforts of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as mandated by the Endangered Species Act, have been incredibly successful, a fact known probably only to the employees of the service and their immediate families. Of the thousands of animals, birds, flowers, insects and plants in the U.S. that have been listed as endangered or threatened, a total of seven have actually gone extinct. And none of these extinctions occurred in the past two decades. In contrast, bald eagles, crocodiles, grey wolves, river otters, beavers, Lake Erie water snakes, bighorn sheep, wild turkeys, Robbins' cinquefoil (a relative of the rose), Aleutian Canada geese, large-flowered skullcaps, Maguire daisies, flying squirrels, grizzly bears, brown pelicans, Hawaiian hawks, silvery minnows, short-tailed albatross, razorback suckers, Houston toads, black-footed ferrets, San Joaquin kit fox, North Atlantic right whales, and others are recovering, and many have been taken off the endangered list. If this comes as a surprise to you, if you think you missed the headlines, don't worry, there were no headlines. Which doesn't make it less true.

Low industry involvement means Latin American nanotech fails

Kay et al 09 School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Shapira- Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester (Luciano, Philip, “Developing nanotechnology in Latin America”, 02/11/2009, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#__ffn_sectitle>//VS)

Our findings suggest policy issues and implications for our group of Latin American countries. For example, all four countries present some level of institutional concentration in their research. This is most pronounced in the case of Brazil, which seems to follow a strategy based on national targets rather than international collaboration, as suggested by the implementation of programs aimed at creating national research networks, like the Rede BrasilNano program. The institutional concentration of research is even greater in Uruguay (which is a much smaller country), but in this case it is consistent with its emphasis in regional collaborations and less developed S&T system. Whether greater incentives for international collaboration in nanotechnology research in Latin America are appropriate is an issue that policymakers in these countries may wish to consider.¶ Moreover, we note the weakness of industry involvement in nanotechnology research. For countries like Chile or Uruguay this is perhaps not surprising, given the emerging state of development in their industrial sectors. The weakness of industry involvement is most significant for Brazil (where conglomerates and internatioally oriented companies have emerged in technology and natural resource sectors) and, to less extent, Argentina. Possible explanations for low industry involvement include the still early stage of nanotechnology development in Latin America, the weakness of domestic corporate R&D, the dominance of foreign multi-national branches who draw on their own company rather than local universities for R&D, a general lack of industry awareness of nanotechnology, and bureaucratic barriers faced by industry in working with universities. Whatever the causes, this finding foreshadows weaknesses not only in industry R&D but also in the absorptive capabilities of firms in Latin America to apply nanotechnology applications. In Brazil, given its efforts to develop aerospace, electronics, and other advanced technologies, as well as in the resource-intensive areas of all the countries (such as the prominent minerals, metals, and pulp and paper sectors in Chile) there may be unexploited opportunities for collaborative nanotechnology R&D with industry in nanomaterials and other nanotechnology domains.

Latin American nanotech initiatives aren’t aligned with key industries—devastates nanotech projects

Kay et al 09 School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Shapira- Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester (Luciano, Philip, “Developing nanotechnology in Latin America”, 02/11/2009, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#__ffn_sectitle>//VS)

Related to this, we observe the concentration of nanotechnology research in a few disciplines and sectors in the four focal countries.29 Although this finding is not surprising when compared with results of previous research, we suggest that these countries might consider strategies that seek to better align public R&D with industry and innovation priorities. At the same time, given the convergent scientific characteristics of nanotechnology, any approach should incorporate different disciplines (de la Vega et al. 2007) as intended by, for example, by the Brazil multidisciplinary research programs. However, the data suggest that nanotechnology research may be not fully aligned with all key industry sectors. For example, there may be needs for additional efforts at nanotechnology interfaces in engineering and electronics in Brazil, and biology and agriculture in both Argentina and Uruguay. On the other hand, Chile is undertaking nanotechnology research in more diverse areas including biology, which is related to important sectors for the country such as forestry and fishing. We note that allying research with economic sectors and potential commercialization targets is not an insignificant task, and even in the leading international centers is not clear what (and how) opportunity area in nanotechnology should best be targeted (Zucker and Darby 2005). Still, there seem to be challenges here for Latin American countries in the mix of research areas: at present, research occurs where academic presence is strongest, but these areas may not always mesh with economic sector opportunities. At the same time, given the existing problems of research scale and resources, it may not be feasible for most Latin American countries to develop new research areas.¶ We found that “Southern” (or intra-MERCOSUR) collaboration levels are relatively low in these four countries.

### Mexico

**No extinction**

**Posner, law prof, 5**—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html, AG)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

**Intervening actors check**

**Zakaria, PhD from Harvard, 9—**Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935, AMiles)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

**Quarantines check**

**CRS Report 5** (Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority, http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33201\_20051212.pdf)

In the wake of recent terrorist attacks and increasing fears about the spread of highly contagious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and pandemic influenza, federal, state, and local governments have become increasingly aware of the need for a comprehensive public health response to such events. An effective response could include the quarantine of persons exposed to infectious biological agents that are naturally occurring or released during a terrorist attack, the isolation of infected persons, and the quarantine of certain cities or neighborhoods.

**Co-evolution prevents spread**

**Achenbach 3** (Joel, Washington Post Staff Writer, "Our Friend, the Plague," Nov, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0311/resources\_who.html, AD: 6/30/09) jl

shimWhenever a new disease appears somewhere on our planet, experts invariably pop up on TV with grave summations of the problem, usually along the lines of, "We're in a war against the microbes"—pause for dramatic effect —"and the microbes are winning." War, however, is a ridiculously overused metaphor and probably should be bombed back to the Stone Age. Paul Ewald, a biologist at the University of Louisville, advocates a different approach to lethal microbes. Forget trying to obliterate them, he says, and focus instead on how they co-evolve with humans. Make them mutate in the right direction. Get the powers of evolution on our side. Disease organisms can, in fact, become less virulent over time. When it was first recognized in Europe around 1495, syphilis killed its human hosts within months. The quick progression of the disease—from infection to death—limited the ability of syphilis to spread. So a new form evolved, one that gave carriers years to infect others. For the same reason, the common cold has become less dangerous. Milder strains of the virus—spread by people out and about, touching things, and shaking hands—have an evolutionary advantage over more debilitating strains. You can't spread a cold very easily if you're incapable of rolling out of bed. This process has already weakened all but one virulent strain of malaria: Plasmodium falciparum succeeds in part because bedridden victims of the disease are more vulnerable to mosquitoes that carry and transmit the parasite. To mitigate malaria, the secret is to improve housing conditions. If people put screens on doors and windows, and use bed nets, it creates an evolutionary incentive for Plasmodium falciparum to become milder and self-limiting. Immobilized people protected by nets and screens can't easily spread the parasite, so evolution would favor forms that let infected people walk around and get bitten by mosquitoes. There are also a few high-tech tricks for nudging microbes in the right evolutionary direction. One company, called MedImmune, has created a flu vaccine using a modified influenza virus that thrives at 77°F instead of 98.6°F, the normal human body temperature. The vaccine can be sprayed in a person's nose, where the virus survives in the cool nasal passages but not in the hot lungs or elsewhere in the body. The immune system produces antibodies that make the person better prepared for most normal, nasty influenza bugs. Maybe someday we'll barely notice when we get colonized by disease organisms. We'll have co-opted them. They'll be like in-laws, a little annoying but tolerable. If a friend sees us sniffling, we'll just say, Oh, it's nothing—just a touch of plague.

No solvency – no incentive to produce expensive vaccines

Spieler 07(Jeff, chief of research, technology and utilization for the Office of Population and Reproductive Health at the US Agency for International Development was held recently at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , “Nanotechnology and Health”, 02/2007, <http://www.anythingbutwork.com/health/nanotechnology.htm>//VS)

Measuring one billionth of a meter, one nanometer is a fraction the average width of a human hair (about 100 000 nanometers). Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, manipulate and manufacture objects between one and 100 nanometers.¶ Dr. Peter A. Singer, senior scientist at the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health and Professor of Medicine at University of Toronto said:¶ "Nanotechnology has the potential to generate enormous health benefits for the more than five billion people living in the developing world. Nanotechnology might provide less-industrialized countries with powerful new tools for diagnosing and treating disease, and might increase the availability of clean water.¶ "But it remains to be seen whether novel applications of nanotechnology will deliver on their promise. A fundamental problem is that people are not engaged and are not talking to each other. Business has little incentive-as shown by the lack of new drugs for malaria, dengue fever and other diseases that disproportionately affect people in developing countries-to invest in the appropriate nanotechnology research targeted at the developing world. Government foreign assistance agencies do not often focus, or focus adequately, on science and technology. With scant public awareness of nanotechnology in any country, there are few efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community groups to examine how nanotechnology could be directed toward, for example, improving public health in the developing world."¶ Previous research by Dr Singer's group identified nanotechnology applications relating to energy, agricultural productivity, water supply, and diagnosis and treatment of disease as having most immediate relevance to the developing world. Researchers also highlighted a surprising amount of innovative nanotechnology R&D in a number of developing countries.¶ Dr. Andrew Maynard, chief science advisor for the Woodrow Wilson Center's Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies commented:¶ "Countries like Brazil, India, China and South Africa have significant nanotechnology research initiatives that could be directed toward the particular needs of the poor. But there is still a danger-if market forces are the only dynamic-that small minorities of people in wealthy nations will benefit from nanotechnology breakthroughs in the health sector, while large majorities, mainly in the developing world, will not. Responsible development of nanotechnology must include benefits for people in both rich and poor nations and at relatively low cost. This also requires that careful attention be paid to possible risks nanotechnology poses for human health and the environment."¶ Dr. Piotr Grodzinski, director of the Nanotechnology Alliance for Cancer at the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health said:¶ "It is my belief that nanomaterials and nanomedical devices will play increasingly critical and beneficial roles in improving the way we diagnose, treat, and ultimately prevent cancer and other diseases. But we face challenges; the complexity of clinical implementation and the treatment cost may cause gradual, rather than immediate, distribution of these novel yet effective approaches.

### US

**Countries don’t compete for economic gains**

**Krugman, econ prof, 94**—professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Ph.D. from MIT (Paul, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” http://www.pkarchive.org/global/pop.html, RBatra)

It was a disappointing evasion, but not a surprising one. After all, the rhetoric of competitiveness -- the view that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is "like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace" -- has become pervasive among opinion leaders throughout the world. People who believe themselves to be sophisticated about the subject take it for granted that the economic problem facing any modern nation is essentially one of competing on world markets -- that the United States and Japan are competitors in the same sense that Coca-Cola competes with Pepsi -- and are unaware that anyone might seriously question that proposition. Every few months a new best-seller warns the American public of the dire consequences of losing the "race" for the 21st century. A whole industry of councils on competitiveness, "geo-economists" and managed trade theorists has sprung up in Washington. Many of these people, having diagnosed America's economic problems in much the same terms as Delors did Europe's, are now in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration formulating economic and trade policy for the United States. So Delors was using a language that was not only convenient but comfortable for him and a wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic.

Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses in the United States are equally misleading. The idea that a country's economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, **that hypothesis is flatly wrong**. That is, it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold -- a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic.

This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system. This last issue is, of course, the most consequential from the standpoint of public policy. Thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to bad economic policies on a wide range of issues, domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade.

Mindless competition

Most people who use the term "competitiveness" do so without a second thought. It seems obvious to them that the analogy between a country and a corporation is reasonable and that to ask whether the United States is competitive in the world market is no different in principle from asking whether General Motors is competitive in the North American minivan market.

In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line: if a corporation cannot afford to pay its workers, suppliers, and bondholders, it will go out of business. So when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is unsustainable -- that unless it improves its performance, it will cease to exist. **Countries, on the other hand, do not go out of business**. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the concept of national competitiveness is elusive.

One might suppose, naively, that the bottom line of a national economy is simply its trade balance, that competitiveness can be measured by the ability of a country to sell more abroad than it buys. But in both theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, a deficit a sign of strength. For example, Mexico was forced to run huge trade surpluses in the 1980s in order to pay the interest on its foreign debt since international investors refused to lend it any more money; it began to run large trade deficits after 1990 as foreign investors recovered confidence and began to pour in new funds. Would anyone want to describe Mexico as a highly competitive nation during the debt crisis era or describe what has happened since 1990 as a loss in competitiveness?

Most writers who worry about the issue at all have therefore tried to define competitiveness as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else. In particular, the most popular definition of competitiveness nowadays runs along the lines of the one given in Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Laura D'Andrea Tyson's Who's Bashing Whom?: competitiveness is "our ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of international competition while our citizens enjoy a standard of living that is both rising and sustainable." This sounds reasonable. If you think about it, however, and test your thoughts against the facts, you will find out that there is much less to this definition than meets the eye.

Consider, for a moment, what the definition would mean for an economy that conducted very little international trade, like the United States in the 1950s. For such an economy, the ability to balance its trade is mostly a matter of getting the exchange rate right. But because trade is such a small factor in the economy, the level of the exchange rate is a minor influence on the standard of living. So in an economy with very little international trade, the growth in living standards -- and thus "competitiveness" according to Tyson's definition -- would be determined almost entirely by domestic factors, primarily the rate of productivity growth. That's domestic productivity growth, period -- not productivity growth relative to other countries. In other words, for an economy with very little international trade, "competitiveness" would turn out to be a funny way of saying "productivity" and would have nothing to do with international competition.

But surely this changes when trade becomes more important, as indeed it has for all major economies? It certainly could change. Suppose that a country finds that although its productivity is steadily rising, it can succeed in exporting only if it repeatedly devalues its currency, selling its exports ever more cheaply on world markets. Then its standard of living, which depends on its purchasing power over imports as well as domestically produced goods, might actually decline. In the jargon of economists, domestic growth might be outweighed by deteriorating terms of trade. So "competitiveness" could turn out really to be about international competition after all.

There is no reason, however, to leave this as a pure speculation; it can easily be checked against the data. Have deteriorating terms of trade in fact been a major drag on the U.S. standard of living? Or has the rate of growth of U.S. real income continued essentially to equal the rate of domestic productivity growth, even though trade is a larger share of income than it used to be?

To answer this question, one need only look at the national income accounts data the Commerce Department publishes regularly in the Survey of Current Business. The standard measure of economic growth in the United States is, of course, real gnp -- a measure that divides the value of goods and services produced in the United States by appropriate price indexes to come up with an estimate of real national output. The Commerce Department also, however, publishes something called "command gnp." This is similar to real gnp except that it divides U.S. exports not by the export price index, but by the price index for U.S. imports. That is, exports are valued by what Americans can buy with the money exports bring. Command gnp therefore measures the volume of goods and services the U.S. economy can "command" -- the nation's purchasing power -- rather than the volume it produces.\ And as we have just seen, "competitiveness" means something diFFerent from "productivity" if and only if purchasing power grows significantly more slowly than output.

Well, here are the numbers. Over the period 1959-73, a period of vigorous growth in U.S. living standards and few concerns about international competition, real gnp per worker-hour grew 1.85 percent annually, while command gnp per hour grew a bit faster, 1.87 percent. From 1973 to 1990, a period of stagnating living standards, command gnp growth per hour slowed to 0.65 percent. Almost all (91 percent) of that slowdown, however, was explained by a decline in domestic productivity growth: real gnp per hour grew only 0.73 percent.

Similar calculations for the European Community and Japan yield similar results. In each case, the growth rate of living standards essentially equals the growth rate of domestic productivity -- not productivity relative to competitors, but simply domestic productivity. Even though world trade is larger than ever before, national living standards are overwhelmingly determined by domestic factors rather than by some competition for world markets.

How can this be in our interdependent world? Part of the answer is that the world is not as interdependent as you might think: **countries are nothing at all like corporations**. Even today, U.S. exports are only 10 percent of the value-added in the economy (which is equal to gnp). That is, the United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services for its own use. By contrast, even the largest corporation sells hardly any of its output to its own workers; the "exports" of General Motors -- its sales to people who do not work there -- are virtually all of its sales, which are more than 2.5 times the corporation's value-added.

Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost purely rivals: only a negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a negligible fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at Coke's expense. But the major industrial countries, while they sell products that compete with each other, are also each other's main export markets and each other's main suppliers of useful imports. If the European economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if anything a successful European economy is likely to help the U.S. economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of superior quality at lower prices.

**International trade, then, is not a zero-sum game**. When productivity rises in Japan, the main result is a rise in Japanese real wages; American or European wages are in principle at least as likely to rise as to fall, and in practice seem to be virtually unaffected.

**U.S. competiveness is high and unrelated to the resources in the system – the aff does nothing**

**Segal, senior fellow at CFR, 11**—Ira A. Lipman senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Adam, 27 July 2011, “The Great Invention Race,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/27/the\_great\_invention\_race, RBatra)

U.S. President Barack Obama's plan to "win the future" by out-innovating the rest of the world was a ringing climax of his State of the Union address this week. Obama suggested increasing U.S. investment in research and development, a good and welcome step. But what will really determine U.S. competitiveness in the global ideas market isn't the money we can pour into the system. It's the strength of the system itself -- the social, political, and cultural institutions that shape ideas from start to finish.

There is no doubt that China and India are catching up with the United States when it comes to hardware -- the raw materials for innovation. They are increasing their spending on science and technology, training more engineers and scientists, applying for more patents, and churning out more research papers.

But the actual system for generating useful ideas in these places remains underdeveloped. Yes, more scientists are being trained, but that doesn't mean they're producing good science. Plagiarism and data fraud are rampant. In a survey of 180 graduates with doctorates quoted in China Daily, 60 percent admitted to paying for their work to be published in academic journals. Sixty percent also said that they had copied someone else's work. Even as a large number of Chinese and Indian scientific stars have returned to their native countries from abroad, they have been unable to transform a research culture characterized by strong bureaucratic control and deference toward age and seniority. In the words of Anita Mehta, a physicist at the S. N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences in India, "Diversity of research or personality is often frowned upon, those who don't match stereotypes or work on subjects that have been hammered to death are labelled 'too independent.'"

In the Indian and Chinese private sectors, there are very real bursts of entrepreneurial activity. But government incentives, especially in China, are focused on making Chinese versions of international products such as cell phones and semiconductors rather than on sparking bold, local innovation. In both countries, new companies must maneuver through an opaque legal system, unpredictable regulations, and volatile capital markets. And though policymakers in Beijing and Delhi are aware of these challenges, addressing them will require political and social change, and so progress will be slow and uneven.

America can't win the hardware race. There are simply too many people -- 2.3 billion people in India and China -- for the United States to compete when it comes to materials and labor. Given respective population size, China and India will one day have more skilled engineers than the United States, even if their quality doesn't match up now. Total U.S. spending on R&D ($395 billion in 2010) is currently more than two and a half times larger than Chinese expenditures ($141 billion), but that gap is rapidly shrinking.

But America can compete when it comes to software -- i.e., the ideas and innovation that are still out of reach for China's and India's more hidebound scientific and business communities. An important first step will be helping small start-ups. Small companies (those with fewer than 500 employees) generate about half of total employment in the United States; according to the Small Business Technology Council, they also employ more scientists and engineers than do large businesses and more than universities and federal labs combined. Specifically, as a recent study by the Kauffman Foundation shows, new small businesses are the ones creating these jobs. Since 1980 nearly all net job creation in the United States occurred in firms less than five years old; over the last four years, these young start-ups created two-thirds of all new jobs.

To help small businesses, the U.S. government needs what William Miller, former vice president and provost of Stanford University and a venture capitalist, describes as "people and place" policies -- policies that support research, training, and collaboration. The Clinic Program at Harvey Mudd College, for example, involves students in solving real-world problems that have immediate commercial or scientific applications. The locus of innovation isn't in individual entities anymore -- universities, for example, or corporate labs -- but in broader ecosystems that combine these more traditional bodies with smaller networked groups. Another transformative example is in Maine, where the North Star Alliance Initiative -- a partnership involving small companies, the University of Maine, community colleges, and the state government -- is leveraging local research to spur the development of a wide range of other industries, including marine and waterfront infrastructure and ballistic armor.

A more holistic model of education will also be crucial. So far, unfortunately, the dominant U.S. policy response to this perceived global competition has been a single-minded focus on increasing the absolute number of scientists. Instead, the United States must think more broadly about the range of skills a scientist develops. Many future breakthroughs are likely to emerge from multidisciplinary work at the nexus of biology, physics, computer science, and mathematics. As a result, young entrepreneurs must be familiar with several different branches of the sciences, as well as be able to draw insights from design, psychology, economics, and anthropology.

Finally, the United States still retains the immense advantage of its connections with global innovation networks. A vast web of collaborative research, corporate alliances, foundation grants, personal ties, alumni groups, and government-to-government contacts tie the United States to established and emerging centers of scientific excellence. In 2005, for example, scientists in the United States were the most popular partners for Chinese and Japanese scientists in every field -- chemistry, physics, engineering, environmental technology, and biology -- but one: material science. And in that field, they were the second most popular choice for both their Japanese and their Chinese colleagues.

The goal, then, is to make sure the United States does not become complacent about these relationships. As the president noted in his State of the Union address, the United States must improve visa regulations, welcome highly skilled immigrants, and create clear paths to citizenship. Those who excel in school or start their own businesses should be encouraged to stay in the United States. At the same time, the United States will have to do more to reach out into the world. The National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, and the National Institutes of Health, for example, should develop programs that provide more international experiences for U.S. scientists -- and not just short trips, but extended sojourns in foreign labs.

Inevitably, more science and scientific discovery will occur abroad in the coming years. But as long as the United States maintains its comparative advantage -- an open and flexible culture and a web of institutions, attitudes, and relationships that move ideas from the lab to the marketplace -- there's no reason why the future isn't in its grasp.

No impact to power decline

Lieber 8 [Robert J., Prof of Government at Georgetown “The Declinists Are Wrong Again” Perspectives Papers on Current Affairs, Perspectives 47 July 30, 2008, http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/perspectives47.html]

On the domestic front, the subprime mortgage crisis, investment bank turmoil, a yawning balance of payments deficit, and the falling dollar lead to a warning that, “We are competing – and losing – in a global marketplace.” And America has become an “enfeebled” superpower, according to Fareed Zakaria, who adds that while the US will not be replaced in the foreseeable future, nevertheless, “Just as the rest of the world is opening up, America is closing down.” The declinists’ central proposition holds that both the rise of other countries and an increasing degree of counterbalancing are transforming the international system and profoundly weakening the leading role of the United States in world affairs. The new declinism rests not only on a global narrative, but it also makes an argument about fundamental domestic weaknesses. It points to the long-term burdens of entitlement programs, which will face large unfunded liabilities. Deficits in international trade and payments and the federal budget, a major credit crisis, collapse of the residential housing bubble and economic turbulence add to the list of troubles. Another clearly overdue task concerns the need to reduce dependence on imported oil and the resultant economic and security vulnerabilities. America’s infrastructure is aging and in need of repair and modernization. In addition, the effectiveness of government institutions may be less than optimal, as evident in the chaotic response to Hurricane Katrina, ongoing problems at the Department of Homeland Security, cumbersome interaction among intelligence agencies, and the need for more effective coordination of national security policy. It is premature to write the epitaph for American power and leadership. In contrast to these arguments and analyses, America continues to maintain a position of relative predominance, and despite an increasing diffusion of power, no single country has emerged as a plausible counterpart or peer competitor. Apart from the long-term possibility of China, none is likely to do so. Similarly, without minimizing the impact of domestic problems, it would be wise not to overstate the likelihood of fundamental economic decline. Current challenges are ultimately manageable and are likely to prove less daunting than those that afflicted the US economy in the mid- to late-1970s and early 1980s. It is worth reminding ourselves that the overall size and dynamism of the economy remains unmatched. Consider that America continues to lead on comparative measures of competitiveness, technology and innovation, for example ranking first in information technology and second (after Finland) in overall competitiveness. The US even ranks first in “space competitiveness.” Higher education and science represent another huge asset. America’s major research universities are outstanding in their international stature and rankings, occupying 17 of the top 20 places and 35 of the top 50. Noteworthy, 70 percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners work in US institutions. Broad demographic trends also favor the United States, whereas countries that are possible peer competitors face much more adverse patterns of aging populations. This is not only true for Russia, Europe, and Japan, but even China is affected as a result of its long-standing one child policy. America’s birthrate is consistently higher than in those countries and its population continues to grow through natural increase as well as immigration. Population patterns thus contribute to the long-term persistence of American predominance. Militarily, no other country possesses anything like the capacity of the United States to project power on a global basis. American military technology remains unmatched, and even when foreign countries may achieve comparable quality in producing an individual type of modern weapon, none come close to parity in the overall systems applicable to land, sea or air warfare. While military spending is enormous in real terms, the defense budget amounts to approximately 4.2 percent of GDP. That contrasts with 6.6 percent at the height of the Reagan buildup and double digit percentages during the early and middle years of the Cold War. In short, the costs of national defense do not by themselves pose an imminent danger of overstretch.

**We’re great at science**

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The predictions are dire, the language grim: Looming shortfalls. Gathering storm. Disturbing mosaic. No, it's not the economy, global warming or the sitcom industry. It's the coming shortage of U.S. scientists and engineers, foretold for decades by corporate, government and education advocates. While there have been warnings for **more than 50 years**, a renewed push over the past four years has earned the attention of both the Bush and Obama administrations. Speaking to the National Academy of Sciences in April, Obama announced "a renewed commitment to education in mathematics and science," fulfilling a campaign promise to train 100,000 scientists and engineers during his presidency. Only problem: We may not have jobs for them all. As the push to train more young people in STEM — science, technology, engineering and math — careers gains steam, a few prominent skeptics are warning that it may be misguided — and that rhetoric about the USA losing its world pre-eminence in science, math and technology **may be a stretch**. One example: Numbers from the U.S. Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics issued Tuesday showed the unemployment rate for electrical engineers hit a record high, 8.6%, in the second quarter, more than doubling from 4.1% in the first quarter. The rate for all engineers climbed to 5.5%, up from 3.9% in the first quarter. Those are still better than the nation's overall unemployment rate of 9.7%, but the world is also still minting thousands of new graduates. U.S. colleges graduated about 460,000 scientists and engineers combined in 2005 (many in social and behavioral sciences), according to the National Science Foundation. Meanwhile, emerging nations such as India and China produced nearly 700,000 engineers alone. But the slow growth of U.S.-born STEM workers, analysts say, may have less to do with funding commitments than with cloudy career paths and low wages relative to other specialized careers such as medicine, law and finance. Among the most vocal critics: Michael Teitelbaum of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in New York, which funds basic scientific, economic and civic research. He says there are "substantially more scientists and engineers" graduating from the USA's universities than can find attractive jobs. "Indeed, science and engineering careers in the U.S. appear to be relatively unattractive" compared with other career paths, he told Congress in 2007. Older and 'overqualified' Alan Weissberger, a 61-year-old telecommunications engineer in Santa Clara, Calif., admits to being "stumped" when people say there's a shortage of engineers. He has been unemployed since 2005. Unemployment, especially among older Silicon Valley engineers, has been a constant reality for the past 20 years, he says. "But it's certainly gone into 'hyper mode' in the last six." Many of his fellow over-40 engineers hear repeatedly that they're actually overqualified for many of the jobs they seek; he recalls that a friend, laid off from Nortel in 2002, couldn't find work for 1½ years, until Santa Clara University hired him — as its dean of engineering. "We do need to work on our STEM education, we do need to draw more people into the field," says Gordon Day, president of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-USA. But he says the market for high-tech workers "is cyclic and it always will be." BLS found that 29,000 electrical engineers were out of work from April to June. Educators and others have been clamoring for more funding for math and science since the Soviets sent Sputnik into orbit in 1957. The push continued in the 1980s, when the National Science Foundation joined top universities to warn of "looming shortfalls" in science and engineering workers, even as employment data showed a surplus. That prompted then-Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, a New York Republican, to call the predictions "the equivalent to shouting 'fire' in a crowded theater." The push picked up speed in 2005 with a key National Research Council report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm. Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates told Congress last year U.S. companies "face a severe shortfall of scientists and engineers with expertise to develop the next generation of breakthroughs. … If we don't reverse these trends, our competitive advantage will erode." But John Marburger, who was George W. Bush's top science adviser, says it's a mistake to think of "scientists" or "engineers" as a generic job classification — or that Americans should fret over shortages overall. "We definitely need more computer scientists and some kinds of electrical engineers," he says. "We need more technicians of all kinds. We probably do not need more string theorists, but we do need more physicists and chemists working on exotic materials." Lynne Munson, executive director of Common Core, a Washington non-profit that supports liberal-arts education in public schools, says **it's not even clear whether the emphasis on STEM skills has produced more scientists** and mathematicians. "We'd argue that you're more likely to get people excelling in all fields if they're given a rich, comprehensive education from the start," she says. "You want more physicists? Make sure kids are getting literature and history." In 2007, amid a renewed push in Congress to get more taxpayer funding for science teachers — and more student aid for science and engineering majors — Teitelbaum told lawmakers that **no objective data** have found overall shortages of scientists and engineers. Such warnings, he said, are "simply the expressions of interests by interest groups and their lobbyists." He cited companies that employ scientists and engineers, universities, and even immigration lawyers. Limited growth possible Rapid increases in federal funding for research and education, Teitelbaum said, are "more likely than not **to further destabilize career paths for junior scientists**," as more funding will generate "substantial growth" in slots for graduate students but only limited growth in the number of career scientific positions down the line. John Holdren, Obama's science adviser, disagrees. He says he's "optimistic that the jobs for them will materialize." "Obviously we've suffered in the past from a boom-and-bust syndrome in funding for science and technology," he says, "and we're looking to try to avoid that going forward." Holdren says he has considered "the size of the pipeline vs. the size of the market," but he and other administration advisers are convinced the USA needs more — not fewer — scientists and engineers. "More and more the challenges we face are going to require big infusions of science and technology to get solved." In his National Academies speech, for example, Obama pointed to energy and climate as areas needing infusions of scientific talent. But nearly two years after he testified before Congress, Teitelbaum says the global financial crisis — and the U.S. government's bid to provide stimulus aid for research — may make the employment picture even worse. Many of the engineers and mathematicians who helped Wall Street firms develop complex credit default swaps and financial derivatives, he says, are finding themselves out of work as their employers shed jobs. And the billions of dollars that Congress promises to help sustain research will probably dry up after two or three years. "We don't know how that's going to work out through the system," he says. Holdren notes that Obama has committed to spending 3% of the USA's gross domestic product on research. In the long run, he says, it'll require "a substantial stepping up by the private sector, which funds about two-thirds of R&D (research and development) in this country right now and will have to continue to do that." Scan Bureau of Labor Statistics projections and **you won't find words like "crisis" or even "shortfall**." In its most recent Occupational Outlook Handbook, BLS says engineering employment is, indeed, expected to grow 11% by 2016 — a 1.3% average yearly increase typical for all occupations — but that the number of engineering graduates "should be in rough balance with the number of job openings." The number of engineering bachelor's degrees grew 10% from 2000 to 2005, according to the National Science Foundation, a 1.7% average yearly increase. You won't find hand-wringing, but you find handbook analysts warning that off-shoring of engineering work "will likely dampen domestic employment growth to some degree." Worldwide, BLS says, well-trained, often English-speaking engineers are "willing to work at much lower salaries than U.S. engineers." A good problem to have? Meanwhile, a few education policy experts say the push for more scientists and engineers has already prompted many public high schools to dilute Advanced Placement classes in a bid to attract more kids. "We're doing this with the same juvenile, fad-minded overselling and incoherence that we deploy in the face of any major new education project," says Rick Hess of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank. "We want to imagine that we can make schools dance in a way that'll quickly deliver subtle refinements in output," he says. "The problem is that we can't currently provide schools that do their core work passably well. All of our STEM aspirations risk becoming a whole new set of distractions, programs and silliness — and all in order to make, at most, marginal differences."

US S&T leadership high now – trends prove

Hummel et al 12 – Hummel - Ph.D in Mathematics, Chief Scientist at Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, former project manager at DARPA. Cheetham – Research Associate for Academic Centers and Programs at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, research and analytical support to policy development projects for DOD (Robert Hummel, Patrick Cheetham, Justin Rossi, “US Science and Technology Leadership, and Technology Grand Challenges,” Synesis, 2012, <http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol3_g/Hummel_2012_G14-39.pdf>)//RH

The US enjoys a science and technology (S&T) enterprise that is the envy of the world. Our universities, industries, laboratories, and government institutions have developed and used technology that has driven economic benefits and secured superpower defense status. The US remains the leader in S&T innovation, a position enjoyed since World War II. While the health of the US S&T enterprise remains strong, there are considerable stresses within each major component. Some believe that the US position as leader in S&T could falter, at least in some fields. We review the stresses in various components of the S&T enterprise and the evidence of trends in S&T quality. We conclude that the enterprise maintains a leadership position for now.

Squo solves –

A. U.S. and Mexico are cooperating on regulations now

HLRCC 12 (High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council, Executive Office of the President of the United States, “UNITED STATES-MEXICO HIGH-LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL WORK PLAN,” 02/28/2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/united-states-mexico-high-level-regulatory-cooperation-council-work-plan.pdf, AC)

The fourth item on the HLRCC Work Plan involves the potential alignment of U.S. and ¶ Mexican policy approaches to oversight of applications of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. ¶ The relevant agencies are the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the ¶ National Metrology Centre (CENAM).¶ Description: Mexico and the United States are in the process of developing principles and ¶ approaches to inform government oversight and regulation of nanotechnology applications and ¶ nanomaterials.¶ Objective/Desired Outcome: Share information and develop approaches on foundational ¶ regulatory elements, including terminology/nomenclature, information-gathering, and ¶ approaches to risk assessment and management. Develop initiatives to align regulatory ¶ approaches in specific areas, such that consistency exists for consumers and industry in Mexico ¶ and the United States.¶ 8¶ INEGI, National Accounts, January to August 2011. UNITED STATES-MEXICO High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council WORK Plan¶ 9¶ Specific Deliverables and Timeline: Specific deliverables identified in the Work Plan include: ¶ The United States will share with Mexico the list of regulators that were involved in ¶ the development of the general nanotechnology principles (accomplished by ¶ September 2011);¶ Response of Mexico’s relevant regulators to the U.S. Memorandum on “Policy ¶ Principles for the U.S. Decision-making Concerning Regulation and Oversight of ¶ Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials,” of June 9, 2011 (accomplished ¶ by October 2011);¶ Creation of a mechanism for exchanging information between the United States and ¶ Mexico on regulatory matters for nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials ¶ (accomplished by February 2012);¶ Share the advances of the Mexican side on potential principles on regulations for ¶ nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials (accomplished by February 2012);¶ and ¶ Engage in a dialogue to consider a possible model framework providing key elements ¶ and approaches to regulating nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials with ¶ respect to potential impacts on the environment, human health, labor, food or ¶ agriculture (by February 2013).¶

B. Meridian Institute

Barker et al. 11 [Todd F. Barker, a Partner at Meridian Institute with more than 15 years designing and managing collaborative problem solving processes. Mr. Barker has worked extensively on issues related to science and technology, including the implications of emerging technologies such as nanotechnology and biotechnology for developing countries, Leili Fatehi, is a graduate student at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. She was a Research Assistant and the Editor of Nanotechnology and Development News at Meridian Institute from 2005 to 2008, Michael T. Lesnick, a founder and Senior Partner of the Meridian Institute, Timothy J Mealey, serves as a convener, facilitator, and mediator of multi-party policy dialogues, negotiations, and collaborative problem solving processes on a wide variety of national and international environmental and sustainable development issues—including issues related to nanotechnology research, development and utilization, Rex R. Raimond, is a Senior Mediator at Meridian Institute where he designs and manages collaborative problem solving processes aimed at helping people solve complex and controversial societal problems, “Nanotechnology and the poor: opportunities and risks for Developing countries”, Nanotechnology and the Challenges of Equity, Equality, and Development

To address this need, Meridian Institute, a non-proﬁt organization that specializes in helping people solve problems and make informed decisions about complex and controversial societal issues,1 has convened the Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and the Poor: Opportunities and Risks (GDNP) to close these gaps through a variety of strategies that raise awareness about the implications of nanotechnology for developing countries, catalyze actions that address speciﬁc opportunities and risks, and identify ways that science and technology can play an appropriate role in the development process. As part of the GDNP process, Meridian is convening a series of sector-speciﬁc activities, beginning with the International Workshop on Nanotechnology, Water, and Development, held October 2006 in Chennai, India. This workshop brought together participants from developed and developing countries and with a broad range of perspectives and expertise to discuss the range of challenges people in developing countries may face when developing and implementing strategies for improving access to clean water and opportunities for using nanotechnology to address water supply challenges, as well as risks, and other issues that need to be addressed in relation to speciﬁc nanotechnology applications. Meridian plans to convene other sector-focused workshops in the areas of commodities (agricultural, mineral, and non-fuel commodities), energy, and health care.

C. Science co-op

NanoTechWire ’10 “International Collaboration Boosts Nanotechnology Research” 12/12

http://nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=11255

Despite their initial focus on national economic competitiveness, the nanotechnology research initiatives now funded by more than 60 countries have become increasingly collaborative, with nearly a quarter of all papers co-authored by researchers across borders. Researchers from the two leading producers of nanotechnology papers -- China and the United States -- have become each nation's most frequent international co-authors. Though Chinese and U.S. researchers now publish roughly the same number of nanotechnology papers, the U.S. retains a lead in the quality of publications -- as measured by the number of early citations. "Despite ten years of emphasis by governments on national nanotechnology initiatives, we find that patterns of nanotechnology research collaboration and funding transcend country boundaries," said Phillip Shapira, study co-author and a professor in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. "For example, we found that U.S. and Chinese researchers have developed a relatively high level of collaboration in nanotechnology research. Each country is the other's leading collaborator in nanotechnology R&D." The findings were part of a new study of nanotechnology publishing reported Dec. 2 in the online edition of the journal Nature. The research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation-supported Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU). Sparked by programs such as the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the United States, leading industrial nations have launched nanotechnology research programs that invested more than $8 billion in public funds in 2008 alone. China, Germany, Japan and Korea are among the many countries that have launched major governmental programs to develop their national nanotechnology capabilities as part of efforts to boost future economic growth. "There is widespread anticipation that nanotechnology will be a critical component in addressing global challenges in such areas as energy, environment, health care, security and sustainability," explained Shapira, who is also a professor of innovation at the University of Manchester. "At the same time, nanotechnology may be a key driver in the next wave of technology-led economic growth and investment. Governments around the world are hoping that their often massive investments in nanotechnology R&D will lead not only to economic, but also to significant societal returns." Though the revolutionary advances that nanotechnology promises are still off into the future, Shapira noted that the investments made so far have led to "a noticeable shift toward innovation in the past few years as companies are beginning to market a wide range of products and devices whose performance has been enhanced by nanoscale science and engineering."

# Grapevine – 2NC – Rd. 5

## Cp tax credits

### 2NC – Overview

#### CP solves the whole case – net benefits are solvency turns – the USFG sucks at implementing foreign cooperation which means only the CP solves – and the politics DA – the CP doesn’t spend money so it doesn’t trigger fights.

#### I’ll go through each internal link he highlighted:

1) pro poor issues – aff doesn’t solve either, no reason the plan would subsidize the poor or nanotech in poor areas – their ev broadly indicates nanotech makes all medical technology cheaper because of better delivery methods – proves any investment in nanotech is sufficient bc it spills over

2) tech leadership – that was 1nc cx – private companies can act as the united states and promote us hegemony and tech leadership – the usfg never actually develops tech – it’s always the private sector – means its sufficient. If boeng orl ockheed or Raytheon developed new nano weapons, they’d sell it to the usfg because of existing military contracting – proves sufficient.

But,

#### Implementation failures take out symbolic benefit of the plan

**Brown and Deutch, 9**

Harold Brown, CSIS Senior Counselor, Former Defense Secretary, and John Deutch, MIT Professor, Former CIA Director, 2/28/2009, “Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy,” http://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/-ReassesUSNuclearPolicyOpEd.pdf

A U.S. pledge to adopt a world free of nuclear weapons as a practical goal can serve initially to attract international cooperation for some counter proliferation measures. But in the long run this promise is likely to lose good will and cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, when it becomes clear that there is no concrete prospect for doing so.

#### Bureaucracy jacks the plan’s signal

Atwood, Dean, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs – U. Minnesota, ‘8

(J. Brian, “Arrested Development,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6, November/December)

As the division of labor among the Pentagon, the State Department, and USAID has become blurred, military bureaucracies have eclipsed their civilian counterparts, thanks largely to their vastly greater resources and greater organizational capacity. Few in Washington, including Secretary Gates, like this situation or think it serves U.S. interests. But nothing will change unless the next president works with Congress to oversee significant institutional reform. Revitalizing the U.S. approach to development assistance should be viewed as a crucial part of the broader effort to revitalize the government’s civilian institutional capacities.

To streamline and strengthen the State Department bureaucracy and restore usaid’s authority over aid programs, all humanitarian and development programs now assigned to the State Department—such as refugee programs, pepfar, and the programs implemented by the new bureau for postconflict reconstruction—should be placed under the aegis of the new usaid. Likewise, democracy-promotion programs and the Defense Department’s aid programs around the world should largely return to civilian control, with the relevant authority and resources assigned to the new usaid. Many cabinet departments understandably have policy interests abroad, but those interests should not include managing their own, independent foreign aid programs. From the early 1960s to 1992, the O⁄ce of Management and Budget aggressively enforced a rule mandating that all foreign aid programs and spending must go through usaid (except when usaid chose to contract with other federal agencies in cases for which it lacked specific technical expertise). It is time to return to that model. Furthermore, the head of the new usaid must have the authority to devise an overall U.S. government strategy on humanitarian and development programs and to coordinate the activities of other departments at the global, country, and regional levels. In addition to presiding over a White House interagency committee on foreign assistance, the new usaid’s head (instead of the secretary of state) should chair the mcc board. The mcc is one of the United States’ most innovative foreign aid programs; it is free of earmarks and promotes genuine partnership with recipient countries. The mcc should be protected from political pressures in Washington that might compromise its eligibility criteria. At the same time, a new, strengthened usaid should be given the authority to help recipient nations design proposals, facilitate the implementation of programs, and evaluate their eªectiveness. Finally, the next president should establish a civilian equivalent to the Joint Chiefs of Staª that would include the most senior career o⁄cers of the State Department, the new usaid, the Treasury Department, and the O⁄ce of the U.S. Trade Representative. Chaired by a senior Foreign Service o⁄cer, this statutory institution would oªer advice to the political leadership on diplomacy, development, and crisis prevention. This group would also provide a source of independent judgment on development issues to agency heads and to the National Security Council, just as the Joint Chiefs do on military matters. Of course, there will be areas of overlapping jurisdiction between the defense, diplomatic, and development institutions. One example is the provision of security assistance in countries recovering from conflict; in these di⁄cult environments, the State Department’s diplomatic mission is crucial, and the Defense Department is needed for training and logistics. The key is who controls the money for noncombat activities. This authority belongs with the diplomatic mission. But when foreign aid payments are involved, the authority should rest squarely with the new, revamped usaid, whether it attains the status of a cabinet-level department or simply greater autonomy as an agency reporting to the secretary of state.

It is official U.S. policy to build strong and effective defense, diplomatic, and development institutions working together to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy. This goal has not yet been achieved. The civilian agencies today are simply not capable of pulling their weight. The next president will have to dramatically overhaul the foreign aid establishment during his first year. The United States’ national security and its global leadership position **will** depend on it.

Also solves us-mexico – we obviously increase tax credits for development of nanotech in cooperation with Mexican and us private sectors – that’s clearly sufficient

### 2nc framing

#### Private sector’s better – empirics and causality – just need incentive

Lau 08Researcher of the Latin American Nanotechnology & Society Network ¶ (ReLANS); PhD. ¶ Candidate in Development Studies at the Universidad Autonoma de Zacatecas (Edgar Zayago, “Nanotechnology may be more useful for Mexican society”, 2008, <http://www.utwente.nl/mesaplus/nanoforumeula/interviews_visiting_researcher/edgarlau.pdf//VS>)

As one of the handful of countries pursuing nanotechnology development in Latin America, ¶ and the one with perhaps the closest relationship with U.S.-based nanotechnology partners, ¶

#### If we disprove the principles behind their affirmative then it has ZERO predictive ability. Their specific warrants are irrelevant if their starting point is flawed

Steele 92 David author and founder of the Libertarian Alliance From Marx to Mises, p 374-5

Does this lead us to embrace the extremely anti-Misesian contention that 'the realism of the assumptions doesn't matter'? 'Unrealistic assumptions' is a euphemism for false assumptions. If 'the assumptions' are part of the theory, then false assumptions mean that the theory is false. The claim, then, is that it doesn't matter whether the theory is false. The claim is usually followed up with the assertion that 'what really matters is whether the theory predicts well'. But if the assumptions are part of the theory, then the theory predicts its own assumptions, and is immediately refuted if one of its assumptions is shown to be false. There can be no worse predictive performance for any theory than for it to be found to require a false assumption: the theory is immediately a failure, as far as prediction goes. We can instead say that 'the assumptions' are not part of the theory, but then it is not clear that the theory needs the 'assumptions'. If the assumptions are expository mnemonics not implied by the theory, or metaphysical views that people who hold the theory find congenial, then there is no reason why they need to be true.

### 2nc – at; expertise

#### Private aid drives innovation—more info access and less regulation

**Kapur, 10**

(Director, Center for Advanced Study of India, and Madan Lal Sobti Professor for the Study of Contemporary India, University of Pennsylvania, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1143, Summer)

Much of the debate on accountability has centered on motivation (incentives) and authority (clarifying roles and power). Enhancing motivation and authority can increase the exercise of accountability. But good accountability also requires good information, and this is where private aid n40 offers exciting possibilities. Private aid--especially from newer and smaller funders--is **likely to drive innovations** in information for two reasons. First, private funders will have to generate their own information because the traditional sources of information n41 on aid activities are often unavailable to them. Second, private funders often make decisions using different types of information than the data supposedly used by official agencies and governments. As we will see, new technologies and approaches in private aid are **creating new feedback mechanisms** that could hopefully migrate to official funders as well.

### Leakage da

#### Leakage of funds from government aid kills effectiveness

**Desai, 10**

(Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution, and Associate Professor of International Development in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1111, Summer)

Official aid is perceived to have low transaction costs because it operates at large scale. But **official aid travels a long route, with costs at each stage**. The first stage is the cost of tax collection when money is transferred from individuals to the treasury. In this stage, costs consist of the direct administrative costs of tax collection as well as deadweight losses from taxation. These costs can be substantial. n24 In the second stage, official donor agencies transfer funds to recipient country governments to support specific development projects and programs. The administrative costs of these agencies have averaged between 4 to 5 percent, according to statistics reported by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. n25 The third stage involves costs associated with transferring the money from the recipient government to final beneficiaries through project implementation. Administrative costs of the project, corruption, and other leakages mean that only about half the funds actually reach their stated end purpose. n26 [\*1127] In all, transaction costs on official aid could amount to 60 percent or more. Private aid, particularly internet-based, offers a **more direct connection between donors and recipients and potentially reduces transaction costs**. At both GlobalGiving or Kiva, the flow of funds route is short: money goes from an individual to the online platform, where it is pooled and transferred to a financial or project intermediary in a recipient country, which then disburses to the final beneficiaries. The long route of passing through government bureaucracies is avoided.

### Compliance

#### Compliance conflicts make government-based aid ineffective

**Natsios, 10**

(Prof of Diplomacy and Government-Georgetown and former administrator of USAID, *Center for Global Development, “*The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development”, July)

The Counter-bureaucracy

One of the little understood, but most powerful and disruptive tensions in established aid agencies lies in the clash between the compliance side of aid programs and the technical, program side. The essential balance between these two tensions in development programs— accountability and control versus good development practice—has now been skewed to such a degree in the U.S. aid system (and in the World Bank as well) that the **imbalance threatens program integrity**. The regulatory pressures in Washington created a force of auditors, accountants, lawyers, and procurement and contracts officers whose job it is to make sure the aid program is managed: (1) in accordance with federal law and regulation―principally the 450-page Foreign Assistance Act, a volume of OMB management circulars, and the 1977 pages of Federal Acquisition Regulations; (2) to produce rapid, measureable program success tracked through quantitative performance indicators usually based on U.S. domestic models of program management or of private industry; and (3) to follow good federal management and accounting practices as demanded by law and regulation. The compliance officers often clash with the technical program specialists over attempts to measure and account for everything and avoid risk. These technical program specialists are experts in the major sector disciplines of development: international health, agriculture, economic (both macro and micro) growth, humanitarian relief, environment, infrastructure, and education. Undertaking development work in poor countries with weak institutions involves a high degree of uncertainty and risk, and aid agencies are under constant scrutiny by policy makers and bureaucratic regulatory bodies to design systems and measures to reduce that risk. In practice, **this means compromising good development practices such as local ownership, a focus on institution building, decentralized decisionmaking** and long-term program planning horizons to assure sustainability in order to reduce risk, improve efficiency (at least as it is defined by federal administrative practice), and ensure proper recordkeeping and documentation for every transaction. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, over several decades, the compliance side of U.S. government aid programs has grown at the expense of the technical, program side. This has happened as a result of four factors. First, the size of the career USAID staff has declined over three decades, stabilizing after 9/11 (and only beginning to rise slowly again in 2005), even as spending more than doubled since 9/11. Second, is the emergence of what Georgetown professor, William Gormley, has called the ―counter-bureaucracy—a set of U.S. government agencies charged with command and control of the federal bureaucracy through a set of budgeting, oversight, accountability, and measurement systems that have grown over several decades to a massive degree, with extraordinary layer upon layer of procedural and compliance requirements. Third, the counter-bureaucracy has become infected with a very bad case of Obsessive Measurement Disorder (OMD), an intellectual dysfunction rooted in the notion that counting everything in government programs (or private industry and increasingly some foundations) will produce better policy choices and improved management. Fourth, demands of the oversight committees of Congress for ever more information, more control systems, and more reports have diverted professional USAID (and now MCC) staff from program work to data collection and reporting requirements. The counter-bureaucracy ignores a central principle of development theory—that those development programs that are most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are the least measurable. This brings us to a central question: what is it that USAID does in its programs that is considered transformational? USAID‘s humanitarian and development work may be broadly broken into three categories: (1) the delivery of goods and services (e.g., distributing of food aid and humanitarian assistance after a disaster, doing immunizations, distributing bed nets to control malaria, building of schools and roads), often through USAID partner contractors, universities, and nongovernmental organizations, (2) the building of local self-sustaining institutions—government, private sector, and nonprofit—through the training of staff, construction of business systems, and development of regular organizational procedures and institutional cultures, and (3) policy dialogue and reform, which means an ongoing discussion and debate about reform and policy changes, between development professionals in USAID missions, in the field, and with cabinet ministers, heads of state, local NGOs and civil society leaders, parliamentarians, and business leaders. The first of these missions―service delivery―includes outcomes that can be counted and seen and that are under the control of the USAID program implementers, while the latter two missions often are neither easily measured nor very visible, and require a long time horizon to achieve success; more important, they require the cooperation and consent of the power structure and leadership in the developing countries, which makes their outcomes more problematic and unpredictable. (A USAID-funded NGO can do a mass immunization of children successfully, but providing funding, training, and equipment to a local health ministry to do the same thing will usually have a more problematic outcome). For that reason, those latter two functions are increasingly underfunded and neglected, yet they are the most important in the long run, as they are more transformational and more central to what development—and state building—is all about. The counter-bureaucracy, dominated by civil servants trained in schools of public administration and business management, employs the measurements and program standards of U.S. domestic government agencies, foundations, and private industry and misapplies them to development programs in poor countries. **Nothing could be further from good development theory and practice**. When the Federal Highway Administration funds and oversees a highway building project, it uses the managerial standards of domestic transportation departments to judge whether the project was managed properly. When GM or Ford builds a car, it uses assembly-line processes developed over the past century. The purpose of these efforts is the building of a highway or assembly of a car. Development, on the other hand, is at its root an effort to build or strengthen institutions (public, private profit-making, and nonprofit civil society) in poor and fragile states, with the ultimate goal of developing a capable state, market economy, and civil society that can manage public services, design good policies, create jobs, and protect human rights and the rule of law on a reliable, sustainable basis after the aid program is over and funding ends. All construction or service delivery projects should be subordinate to the larger institution-building task. The counter-bureaucracy, with its elaborate control mechanisms, misunderstands this central development doctrine and thus misapplies a domestic management lens to aid programs by turning the means into an end. The demands of the counter-bureaucracy are **now so intrusive that they have distorted, misdirected, and disfigured USAID‘s development practice to such a degree that it is compromising U.S. national security objectives** and challenging established principles of good development practice. This regulatory apparatus has created an incentive structure that has led to an emphasis on process over program substance and, in so doing, has produced a perverse bureaucratic result; as the career staff has declined in size absolutely and proportionately to the size of the aid budget, the compliance side of aid has taken over management and decision making at the agency. When the agency does not comply with the commands of the counter- bureaucracy, it faces stiff penalties, but there is no legal or regulatory consequence if agency staff do not regularly interact with government officials, civil society organizations, and the business people in developing countries about political, economic, and social policy reform— i.e., the central practices of development work. The newest addition to the counter-bureaucracy—the State Department‘s Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance—is making matters worse, creating an even more dysfunctional set of incentives that are compromising the integrity of aid programs by the demand for metrics for every program and through the laborious and time-consuming annual process of each USAID mission writing an Annual Operating Plan. The question remains whether under sustained pressure from the counter-bureaucracy and the Congress, USAID is now spending as much money on oversight and control as on implementation of the aid program itself. What is more, the staff time needed to comply with all of these paperwork requirements has crowded out any remaining available time for the actual implementation of programs in the field offices. A point can be reached when compliance becomes counterproductive. I believe we are well past that point. What happened, why it happened, and how it happened is a disturbing, but also fascinating, story of good intentions—accountability and transparency—gone bad. The consequences of these counter-bureaucratic trends explain a great deal about why USAID business systems are designed as they are. But, before we get to the story of compliance and bureaucracy ―gone bad, we need a framework for our analysis. The source for that framework comes from the work of political scientist and scholar on public administration practice in U.S. state and national governments—and my former professor—James Q. Wilson.

#### Prefer our evidence—his experience inside the agency makes him qualified

**Jayawickrama, 10**

(Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University., http://hausercenter.org/iha/2010/07/09/when-aid-bureaucracy-and-development-clash-a-former-usaid-administrator-speaks-out/)

A newly-published essay by Andrew Natsios – who served as USAID Administrator from 2001 to 2006 – lays bare the tension between the compliance side of aid bureaucracies and the programmatic side of those same agencies. He argues that the balance has now tipped so strongly toward compliance that the integrity of programs is under threat. He also asserts that the compliance side of aid has taken over management and decision-making at USAID. It is interesting to see Natsios, who presided over this “counter-bureaucracy” for five years, rip into the compliance culture that he oversaw. He does so with a **clarity and insight that should not be ignored** as development and foreign assistance policies are being redefined by the Obama Administration and on Capitol Hill. Ironically, Natsios’ account of these tensions and imbalances may also reveal why these policy processes seem to be so bogged down and delayed. Natsios provides a historical perspective of how the compliance culture came to be dominant within the U.S. foreign assistance bureaucracy – he calls it “a painful story of good intentions gone bad.” He is unsparing in his critique of what this has resulted in, and declares that it is well past the point where compliance has become counter-productive. Natsios argues that the demands of this compliance culture “are now so intrusive that they have distorted, misdirected and disfigured USAID’s development practice to such a degree that it is compromising U.S. national security objectives and challenging established principles of good development practice.” The argument that Natsios makes – that increasing pressure to measure outcomes or impacts can lead to a tendency to invest in interventions that can be easily measured – is not a new one, but **his “view from the inside” gives even more credence to this perspective.** Natsios starts from the principle that development programs that are most precisely and easily measured are often the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are often the least measurable. He posits that health programs have become the most favored sector in U.S. foreign assistance because health outcomes are more easily measured, and that democracy and governance programs have been underfunded because their results are hard to measure (especially within short timeframes). I suspect that Natsios paints this picture so starkly in order to get his central arguments across: that measurability does not equal development significance, that good development must be the unequivocal goal of U.S. foreign assistance and that foreign aid systems and processes must not unintentionally undermine that goal.

### Aid dependence

#### Solves local growth and sustainable development – avoids dependence on foreign aid in the host country

Muzinich and Werker, 08 Justin, works for a hedge fund in Connecticut, and Eric, assistant professor at Harvard Business School, 6/2, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5767>, “A Better Approach To Foreign Aid,” ADM

Traditional government-to-government aid can be spent by the recipient country on public goods the private sector might not supply, such as medicine for those who cannot afford it and public schools. Defenders of the status quo might therefore argue that tax breaks do not allow for public goods spending, since these breaks go to businesses and individuals, both private recipients. There is merit to such an argument, and public goods are clearly a worthwhile use of money, which is one reason we suggest transferring only some taxpayer dollars from traditional aid to tax credits. Yet a body of academic research shows that private capital flows can raise wages and create positive spillover effects in the host country. These are valuable benefits which over the long run will allow a country to provide for its own public goods rather than relying on foreign handouts to do so. In fact, developing countries have themselves already understood what current U.S. foreign aid policy has not — that private development finance is vital to long-run development. The best evidence of this is that many developing countries are already spending their own money on tax credits to attract foreign investment and on programs to enable their citizens to seek work overseas. World Bank studies show that tax credits and investment promotion work to attract foreign investment, so it is not surprising that countries spend money in these areas. Of course, these countries have no shortage of competing priorities that require funding. A system of U.S. tax credits and breaks would allow the benefits of foreign investment and remittances to take hold much more quickly and without breaking the bank of developing countries. A development tax credit thus represents a shift in the delivery of foreign aid. It is a move from handouts to empowerment, from less aid to more, and from waste to efficiency. It is what developing countries themselves recognize as the key to long-run sustainable growth. And since tax credits and pre-tax deductions can be adopted incrementally, they are a pragmatic way to introduce changes to the model of foreign assistance. More broadly, employing the tax system for development is a way to use government incentives to encourage and channel private transfers that will have a great impact on reducing poverty. Large government-to-government aid programs worked well in the period immediately following World War II, when the Marshall Plan brought the economies of Europe and Japan back up to speed. But those nations already had experience with market-driven prosperity and the institutions to support it. What was missing was a stimulus to demand (plus foreign exchange), and foreign aid packages provided that. However, countries that have escaped poverty in the postwar era have largely done so through harnessing the productive capacities of the private sector — frequently foreign investment. It is time that policymakers heed the lessons of development success stories from the second half of the twentieth century and rethink the old foreign aid paradigm.

#### Turns the aff – prevents *long-term*, *sustainable* reforms and creates instability

Bräutigam, 2K Deborah, School of International Service, American University, Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000, <http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap/swap404.pdf>, “Aid Dependence and Governance,” ADM

Political leaders must continually balance their pursuit of policy objectives (including development) and their primary goal of remaining in power. In order to do both, they must strike bargains with other power-holders in government, society, and in aid agencies. Aid dependence gives aid agencies extraordinary power in these negotiations, but this can backfire. Aid dependence can make reforms less likely to occur. It can contribute to a “strong president, weak parliament” syndrome, distort political accountability, weaken government ownership of reforms (and thus reduce their likelihood of enactment, or of being sustained), contribute to the short time horizons and uncertainty that plague efforts at cooperation in poor countries, and may reinforce patronage practices. By-passing central governments and shifting large amounts of aid to NGOs or local governments may not alleviate any of these problems, but simply cause them to appear in another form. State capacity, bureaucratic competence and corruption The goal of governance reforms is primarily to increase the quality of public institutions and to reduce corruption. Yet large amounts of aid and technical assistance enable bureaucracies to continue functioning without at the same time creating any incentive for them to cooperate with efforts to increase meritocratic appointments, reduce corruption in procurement and provision of services, or cut back on unsustainable numbers of public employees. In addition, aid dependence means that countries are deeply exposed to some of the most criticized practices in the aid system: by-passing instead of building capacity, poaching talented staff from government offices, providing unnecessary and unwelcome technical assistance. This directly affects the institutional context within which bureaucracies operate, and has created some significant barriers to the development of more effective states. Finally, high levels of aid tend to lessen pressures that might push the development of bureaucratic accountability. In aid dependent countries, accountability for the funding is valued most highly by those who provide the bulk of the funds: the donors. Many aid dependent countries have not developed the capacity to carry out extensive audits. Instead, donors substitute their own accountants and reporting, creating an enclave of accountability that rarely grows beyond its borders. Taxing and spending: budgeting and fiscal management Budgeting in many aid dependent countries have collapsed under the weight of many hundreds of projects and policy conditions. Yet aid dependence itself inhibits the budget restructuring required by economic crisis. Aid dependence tends to exacerbate problems of budget fragmentation, repetitive budgeting, and cash flow management. Budgets that are essentially aggregates of donor projects are divorced from planning and policy objectives. Continuedprovision of large amounts of aid over long periods of time removes the hardbudget constraint from government calculations of what is affordable andsustainable in policy choices, and genuinely hard budget constraints are essential for keeping government commitments at sustainable levels. Finally,countries that are heavily dependent on aid tend to have lower levels of tax effort, suggesting that large amounts of aid may serve to reinforce inadequate revenue collection efforts.

## Status quo

### 2nc – patenting

Patenting takes out solvency – patents for nanotech are concentrated in wealthy countries – any cooperation that the aff results in is for naught because developing nations do not have the financial means to pay for the aff – that’s Foladori – at worst it stays limited so no escalation

Patenting failures and lack of incentives kills nanotech development

Kay et al 09 School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Shapira- Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester (Luciano, Philip, “Developing nanotechnology in Latin America”, 02/11/2009, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#__ffn_sectitle>//VS)

Finally, the lack of nanotechnology patenting activity has two possible explanations. The first is that these countries are in an early stage of nanotechnology development and only after some years they will be able to transform research knowledge to intellectual property that can be used for the commercialization of nanotechnology applications and nanotechnology-based products. The second explanation has more policy implications: not only may these countries be undertaking nanotechnology research that is not aligned to local industry priorities but there may also be insufficient incentives for researchers to collaborate with incumbent industries and to initiate their own start-up enterprises. If Latin American S&T policymakers want to foster the development of nanotechnology and increase transfer to and take-up by key industry sectors, they may need to encourage research and incentives that can lead to the commercialization of new technologies in national and international markets. For this, it may be necessary to increase industry–academy collaborations, intellectual property protection, and enterprise support—all pending tasks for Latin American countries (Kraul [2003](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#CR29); Fernández and Schatzmann [2007](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#CR12); Foladori and Fuentes [2007](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#CR15)).

Latin American nanotech initiatives aren’t aligned with key industries—devastates nanotech projects

Kay et al 09 School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Shapira- Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester (Luciano, Philip, “Developing nanotechnology in Latin America”, 02/11/2009, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988220/#__ffn_sectitle>//VS)

Related to this, we observe the concentration of nanotechnology research in a few disciplines and sectors in the four focal countries.29 Although this finding is not surprising when compared with results of previous research, we suggest that these countries might consider strategies that seek to better align public R&D with industry and innovation priorities. At the same time, given the convergent scientific characteristics of nanotechnology, any approach should incorporate different disciplines (de la Vega et al. 2007) as intended by, for example, by the Brazil multidisciplinary research programs. However, the data suggest that nanotechnology research may be not fully aligned with all key industry sectors. For example, there may be needs for additional efforts at nanotechnology interfaces in engineering and electronics in Brazil, and biology and agriculture in both Argentina and Uruguay. On the other hand, Chile is undertaking nanotechnology research in more diverse areas including biology, which is related to important sectors for the country such as forestry and fishing. We note that allying research with economic sectors and potential commercialization targets is not an insignificant task, and even in the leading international centers is not clear what (and how) opportunity area in nanotechnology should best be targeted (Zucker and Darby 2005). Still, there seem to be challenges here for Latin American countries in the mix of research areas: at present, research occurs where academic presence is strongest, but these areas may not always mesh with economic sector opportunities. At the same time, given the existing problems of research scale and resources, it may not be feasible for most Latin American countries to develop new research areas.¶ We found that “Southern” (or intra-MERCOSUR) collaboration levels are relatively low in these four countries.

### 2nc – at: enviro

**Environmental protection high now**

**Almasy 10** (Steve, April 23 9, “Earth Day at 40: Environmental movement has undergone significant change”, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/22/earth.day.at.40/index.html, ZBurdette)

Professor William Moomaw has been a part of the environmental movement since the 1960s. Moomaw, now a professor of International Environmental Policy at Tufts University's Fletcher School, agrees. Moomaw said that in many ways, the environment is a lot better than 40 years ago. Take for instance the air in Los Angeles, California, which was horrendous then. The ozone level in the area was almost five times greater than the national standard in 1970, according to the California EPA. In 2000, the level had dropped by nearly 70 percent. "And we changed laws and practices and purchases and it got better," he said. "I think the belief in the beginning was that somehow the public would sort of whip the government into shape and they would do the right thing and the world would be saved. I think we all discovered the hard way that it's more complicated than that." What has changed, the environmentalists say, is there has been a subtle shift from the days of teach-ins to community activism by the middle class to a social movement where people realize the connections between economic status and the health of the planet. "People are being more realistic about the larger shape of the challenge," said Tom Athanasiou, director of EcoEquity, a think tank that deals with developing viable approaches to climate change. "There's no way that we're going to be able to deal with the climate while leaving all the poor people behind." He said the green jobs movement -- developing renewable energy companies, hiring companies that use or sell environmentally friendly products -- is key, especially in countries hit by high unemployment. A creative look at how to build infrastructure that emits far less carbon dioxide is vital, he said. "You have to give the poor alternatives other than to pour into these slum cities that are becoming the norm. You have to give them lower impact options," he said of the movement of people in developing nations to polluted big cities. The issue is to provide goods and services in an environmentally friendly way that doesn't negatively affect the economy and social structure, Moomaw said. "The shift that's taken place is to get beyond just protecting the environment. The new way that it is talked about is in terms of sustainable development," he said. Beinecke said one of the things that is greatly different from 1970 is how to frame the solution to the world's problems. Governments, businesses and individuals all must take a role in eliminating the factors of climate change, but solutions need to be practical and not too expensive, she said. Earth Day continues to have relevance even though the focus of the event has changed, the experts said. While it is no longer just a college-based event, it still offers teaching opportunities to all types of people and enhances the increased environmental awareness that this generation has gained. More people are "connecting the dots and understanding that what they do in their lives has an impact on others," Athanasiou said. Moomaw added that not only are companies now involved in Earth Day, but they are also much more involved in environmental protection. "There are certainly many, many more corporations that are not only willingly complying with environmental laws but many are going beyond them," he said. "It's an impressive group of companies that are doing those things and they're making a real difference. I don't think anybody believed that would happen in 1970." That includes companies like DuPont, which has taken steps to dramatically cut its greenhouse gas emissions and use more renewable fuels, and IBM, which has an excellent environmental record, Moomaw said. For the 40th anniversary of Earth Day, the Earth Day Network is sponsoring events on the National Mall in Washington on April 24 and 25. The schedule includes a climate rally and concert on Sunday featuring Sting and John Legend. "Earth Day continues to be a national reminder," Beinecke said. "Companies and individuals feel a responsibility to think about the environment, and that is really important."

**Momentum is on our side—it’ll keep getting better**

**Anderson 8** – Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the executive director of the Property and Environment Research Center, author of over thirty books (Terry and Laura Huggins, 9/5, Greener Than Thou, http://media.hoover.org/documents/Anderson\_Huggins\_Greener\_Than\_Thou\_35.pdf, AG)

When statistician Bjørn Lomborg published his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, he was attacked for finding that the environmental litany of gloom and doom does not hold up against the data. As he puts it, “When you have the data, pound the data; when you don’t, pound the table.” Amid the continued crescendo of table pounding, let us consider the data on various measures of natural resource use and environmental quality. Terrestrial Resources As noted, a combination of genetically designed high-yield crops, improved irrigation techniques, better fertilizers and pesticides, and scientific crop management has resulted in a continuous increase in agricultural productivity. According to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, world wheat production has tripled since 1961. Wheat production in 2005 was just shy of the all-time high of 2004. Wheat production in developing countries has increased from twenty-seven kilograms per capita in 1961 to fifty-three kilograms per capita in 2003—a 96 percent increase. Coarse grain production has also gone up in developing countries. In 1961, developing countries produced sixty-eight kilograms per capita; production had increased to eighty-two kilograms per capita by 2003. And increases in crop yield per acre accounted for more than 80 percent of the increase in food production in developing countries from 1961 to 2000 (Evenson and Gollin 2003, 760). The revolution in agriculture continues to increase productivity per acre, leaving more acres for other uses, including open space and wildlife habitat. In India, for example, the Atlantic Monthly reported that from the 1960s through the 1980s “Green Revolution advances saved more than 100 million acres of wild lands” (Rauch 2003, 106). In fact, between 1981 and 2000 the area under cultivation in Latin America decreased 0.5 percent; overall production increased 1.6 percent (Evenson and Gollin 2003, 760). More recently, higher yields from genetically modified crops have reduced and in some cases stopped forest clearing in Honduras and the Philippines. One agricultural expert, Dennis Avery of the Hudson Institute, says that, absent improvements in farming techniques and yields since 1950, the world would have lost an additional 20 million square miles of wildlife habitat, most of it forest, to agriculture. About sixteen million square miles of forest exist today, so in a sense advances in agriculture “have saved every square mile of forest on the planet,” says Avery (quoted in Rauch 2003, 106). Indur Goklany, in his book The Improving State of the World, shows that, even in the face of population growth, the amount of land used for agriculture has come nowhere close to matching the growth rate in population. From 1961 to 2002, world population increased 102 percent; the land used for agriculture increased only 13 percent worldwide. One of the neo-Malthusians’ greatest concerns is that population growth will require such a large amount of land to be used for agriculture that land for habitat will be lost and degraded. Such predictions of doom, once again, are not supported by the data. Advances in technology have significantly reduced the amount of land needed to feed a growing population. Goklany shows that, across the world, cropland per capita decreased by 44 percent from 1961 to 2002 and that, over the same period, food supplies per capita actually increased 24 percent (2007, 123–25). Some of the loudest table pounding has been over deforestation. A 1998 press release from the Worldwatch Institute titled “Accelerating Demand for Land, Wood, and Paper Pushing World’s Forests to the Brink” warned of a “global catastrophe.” What do the data say? The FAO’s Global Forest Resource Assessment for 2005 reports that the yearly change in forest cover has gone from \_0.22 percent from 1990 to 2000 to \_0.18 percent from 2000 to 2005. In many parts of the world, forest cover is increasing. The United States had more than 298 million hectares of forest cover in 1990. By 2005, that number had grown to more than 303 million hectares. Other countries, such as New Zealand, Chile, Uruguay, Spain, Russia, India, and China, have also increased their amount of forest cover during 1990–2005. The cries of a “global chainsaw massacre” (Serrill 1997) are simply not true. Regarding endangered species, in Norman Myers’s 1979 book The Sinking Ark, Myers estimated that 40,000 species would become extinct every year for the next twenty-five years. Myers arrived at this figure by “presuming” that one million species would become extinct over the next twenty-five years and then simply divided one million by twenty-five to get 40,000 per year. There were no data to support this presumption. Nevertheless, this number has become the official estimate of the table pounders. Each year the World Conservation Union publishes its Red List of Threatened Species, the publication of record for threatened and endangered species. The 2004 edition reported that, in the past twenty years, twenty-seven species have become extinct, with another 208 possibly having gone extinct (there are no data to support that possibility). Either way, this is nowhere near the Meyers presumption of 40,000 a year. The World Conservation Union also reports that, from 2003 to 2004, 352 species were moved to a higher threat category (i.e., became more vulnerable), but 363 were moved to a lower threat cat egory (2004). Once again the table pounding has drowned out the data pounding. Water covers approximately three-quarters of the earth. About 97 percent of water is found in the oceans; just over 2 percent makes up the polar ice caps, leaving less than 1 percent of earth’s water available for human consumption and use. Humans currently use 18 percent of this accessible water every year (Postel, Daily, and Ehrlich 1996, 787). The World Bank’s World Development Report 1994 reported that, in 1970, 34 percent of the population of developing countries had access to safe drinking water. In the year 2000, a U.N. report by Secretary- General Kofi Annan stated that 78 percent of the population of developing countries had access to drinking water. In other words, in thirty years the percentage of the population with access to safe drinking water has more than doubled. In addition to more people having access to water, the quality of water has improved. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (2003) reported that, in 2002, 94 percent of the population got its water from systems that had no health violations, an increase from 79 percent in 1993. Also, the lakes and rivers of the United States have become cleaner. The Great Lakes, for example, which contain 20 percent of all the fresh surface water on earth, have seen a steady decline in chemical pollution since the early seventies. Between 1974 and 2005, levels of DDE, PCBs, and HCB (as measured by concentrations in herring gull eggs) declined by a minimum of 87 percent and a maximum of 99.5 percent in the various Great Lakes.3 Dissolved oxygen, an essential ingredient for aquatic species and one of the best indicators of water quality, has also increased in most major rivers and lakes. For example, dissolved oxygen levels in New York Harbor have steadily improved since the 1970s (NYC Department of Environmental Protection 2003). Long Island Sound, a major area of concern for its low levels of oxygen, has seen its levels of dissolved oxygen improve. From 1985 to 2005, the area (in square miles) and duration of low oxygen levels in the sound have exhibited a downward trend (Hayward and Kaleita 2007). The proportion of low-quality rivers in the United States and the United Kingdom, as defined by the President’s Council on Environmental Quality and the Environment Agency, has also steadily declined since the 1970s (Lomborg 2001, 204). According to the Environment Agency, the percentage of bad and poor-quality rivers in the United Kingdom fell from 9.7 percent in 1990 to 4.6 percent in 2005, whereas the ratio of good-quality rivers increased by 10.3 percentage points over the same period (2007). These data suggest that access to clean water and water quality have been improving. Atmospheric Resources Air quality in the United States has also improved. Based on EPA data, air quality in the United States has significantly improved since 1980. Levels of nitrogen dioxide (NO2), ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), and lead (Pb) all dropped between 1980 and 2006 (see figure 10). Smog was once heard about every day in the popular press and media; today, smog is only a problem in lower-income developing countries. In addition to these improvements, particulate matter, which is made up of small solid and liquid particles suspended in the ambient air and is associated with negative health effects, has also significantly decreased. Particulate matter comes from various sources, such as residential wood burning, coal- and oil-fired power plants, and dust particles from roads and fields. The EPA estimates that particulate matter has decreased by more than 30 percent during the past twenty-five years (2007b).4

## **US**

### 2nc – sq solves

Squo solves – 3 warrants –

A. The US and Mexico have regs now – the HLRCC work plan mandates: approaches to risk assessment and management in NT, initiatives for regulatory approaches, a mechanism for info sharing on NT, and shared principals on the regs – that’s HLRCC

B. Meridian Institute solves coop – postdates their ev by 2 years

Barker et al. 11 [Todd F. Barker, a Partner at Meridian Institute with more than 15 years designing and managing collaborative problem solving processes. Mr. Barker has worked extensively on issues related to science and technology, including the implications of emerging technologies such as nanotechnology and biotechnology for developing countries, Leili Fatehi, is a graduate student at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. She was a Research Assistant and the Editor of Nanotechnology and Development News at Meridian Institute from 2005 to 2008, Michael T. Lesnick, a founder and Senior Partner of the Meridian Institute, Timothy J Mealey, serves as a convener, facilitator, and mediator of multi-party policy dialogues, negotiations, and collaborative problem solving processes on a wide variety of national and international environmental and sustainable development issues—including issues related to nanotechnology research, development and utilization, Rex R. Raimond, is a Senior Mediator at Meridian Institute where he designs and manages collaborative problem solving processes aimed at helping people solve complex and controversial societal problems, “Nanotechnology and the poor: opportunities and risks for Developing countries”, Nanotechnology and the Challenges of Equity, Equality, and Development

To address this need, Meridian Institute, a non-proﬁt organization that specializes in helping people solve problems and make informed decisions about complex and controversial societal issues,1 has convened the Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and the Poor: Opportunities and Risks (GDNP) to close these gaps through a variety of strategies that raise awareness about the implications of nanotechnology for developing countries, catalyze actions that address speciﬁc opportunities and risks, and identify ways that science and technology can play an appropriate role in the development process. As part of the GDNP process, Meridian is convening a series of sector-speciﬁc activities, beginning with the International Workshop on Nanotechnology, Water, and Development, held October 2006 in Chennai, India. This workshop brought together participants from developed and developing countries and with a broad range of perspectives and expertise to discuss the range of challenges people in developing countries may face when developing and implementing strategies for improving access to clean water and opportunities for using nanotechnology to address water supply challenges, as well as risks, and other issues that need to be addressed in relation to speciﬁc nanotechnology applications. Meridian plans to convene other sector-focused workshops in the areas of commodities (agricultural, mineral, and non-fuel commodities), energy, and health care.

C. Science co-op

NanoTechWire ’10 “International Collaboration Boosts Nanotechnology Research” 12/12

http://nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=11255

Despite their initial focus on national economic competitiveness, the nanotechnology research initiatives now funded by more than 60 countries have become increasingly collaborative, with nearly a quarter of all papers co-authored by researchers across borders. Researchers from the two leading producers of nanotechnology papers -- China and the United States -- have become each nation's most frequent international co-authors. Though Chinese and U.S. researchers now publish roughly the same number of nanotechnology papers, the U.S. retains a lead in the quality of publications -- as measured by the number of early citations. "Despite ten years of emphasis by governments on national nanotechnology initiatives, we find that patterns of nanotechnology research collaboration and funding transcend country boundaries," said Phillip Shapira, study co-author and a professor in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. "For example, we found that U.S. and Chinese researchers have developed a relatively high level of collaboration in nanotechnology research. Each country is the other's leading collaborator in nanotechnology R&D." The findings were part of a new study of nanotechnology publishing reported Dec. 2 in the online edition of the journal Nature. The research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation-supported Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU). Sparked by programs such as the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the United States, leading industrial nations have launched nanotechnology research programs that invested more than $8 billion in public funds in 2008 alone. China, Germany, Japan and Korea are among the many countries that have launched major governmental programs to develop their national nanotechnology capabilities as part of efforts to boost future economic growth. "There is widespread anticipation that nanotechnology will be a critical component in addressing global challenges in such areas as energy, environment, health care, security and sustainability," explained Shapira, who is also a professor of innovation at the University of Manchester. "At the same time, nanotechnology may be a key driver in the next wave of technology-led economic growth and investment. Governments around the world are hoping that their often massive investments in nanotechnology R&D will lead not only to economic, but also to significant societal returns." Though the revolutionary advances that nanotechnology promises are still off into the future, Shapira noted that the investments made so far have led to "a noticeable shift toward innovation in the past few years as companies are beginning to market a wide range of products and devices whose performance has been enhanced by nanoscale science and engineering."

### 2nc – leadership high

S&T leadership is high – the US has used its economic standing to bolster its R&D – directly impact its S&T field – the US has been the leader since WWII and shows no signs of slowing – that’s Hummel

**No shortage of STEM workers—that’s Vergano. Their authors have been making the same warnings for 50 years without any objective data—increases in STEM education only create labor market instability because there aren’t enough jobs to fill all the spots**

#### Treat this as a status quo CP – none of their ev is reverse causal that not producing nanotech regulations hinders competitiveness – other areas fill in.

**Wage rates prove no shortage**

**Guess 8** – Quoting Teitelbaum, demographer (Andy, 17 September 2008, Challenging Conventional Wisdom on STEM Supply, <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/17/pcast>, RBatra)

Michael S. Teitelbaum, a demographer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, looked at what he called five “mysteries” of the STEM work force issue. For example, why do employers claim a shortage of qualified STEM graduates while prospects for Ph.D.s remain “poor"? Why do retention and completion rates for STEM fields remain low compared with students’ aspirations? Why is there a “serious” funding crisis at the National Institutes of Health after its budget doubled from 1998 to 2003?

Looking at whether there is a shortage of qualified STEM workers, Teitelbaum argued that such claims reappear roughly every 10 years. In the late 1980s, he said, speculations of looming shortfalls were “wildly wrong,” while successful lobbying in the late 1990s to triple the number of H-1B visas to fulfill a supposed shortage coincided with the IT bust — and a resulting collapse in demand for workers — in 2001.

More recently, he said, similar claims are arising with testimony from heavy hitters in the technology sector such as Bill Gates — but still, he argued, **the evidence doesn’t support the view that there is a shortage of scientists or engineers**. A shortage of workers would imply an increase in wages, but remuneration remains flat; in general, he said, there is significant variation over time and by field, with a mix of “hot” fields and “slack” markets.

### 2nc – no benefit

No impact to the advantage – projects are directed by the government and for the government – there can’t be any break through innovation which kills S&T perception – that’s Coletta

Federal science is politicized – it undermines innovation – they can’t solve hegemony

Coletta, 9 ­ - Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado (Damon, “Science, Technology, and the Quest for International Influence,” September,

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536133&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Based on how U.S. constitutional democracy is structured, we should observe a recurring tension between society‘s desire to benefit from professional expertise and its demand for accountability. In the U.S. case, scientific advice and scientific research sponsored by the state have been articulated across mission-oriented agencies serving an urgent governmental function—defense, commerce, health, agriculture. With few exceptions, even the National Science Foundation is not entirely immune, research sponsors and laboratories within the U.S. Government feel enormous pressure. Operational branches of the Executive agencies, massive in terms of budget and personnel compared to R&D, as well as Congressional representatives on key authorizing committees, push U.S. Science to be technologically relevant. In the language of the Defense Department‘s framework, there is a steep downhill slope running from 6.1 (basic research) to 6.2 (applied research).

We have seen evidence of the tendency to slip away from pure science sponsorship in the budget

hearings of Congressional committees on Science and Technology and Armed Services, as well as the

evolution of the nation‘s first post-World War II science agency—the Office of Naval Research—away

from basic research. The question remains whether democratic pressure to harvest superior technology,

to the point of neglecting what one chair of the Projection Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services

called the seed corn of innovation, levies costs on U.S. foreign policy serious enough to hamper the

superpower‘s bid for sustainable hegemony.

### 2nc – at: heg

#### Heg is high and sustainable – economic growth, domestic industrialization, competitors’ decline, and structural constants

Drezner 7/29 (Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, contributing editor to Foreign Policy/Foreign Affairs, former professor at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado, Boulder, Drezner has received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. BA from Williams College, MA and PhD in international relations from Stanford University, The Spectator, June 29, 2013, “While Britain stagnates, America is roaring back,” <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8946671/while-britain-stagnates-america-is-roaring-back/>, alp)

Predicting the decline of the United States has been in vogue since the birth of American hegemony. Sputnik, Vietnam, stagflation, budget deficits, trade deficits and even the end of the Cold War all triggered predictions of the end of America. With the 2008 financial crisis, however, there seemed to be a sense that this time was different. Tomes with titles like The Post-American World and The End of Influence began to appear on bookshelves. Germany’s finance minister confidently predicted that the United States was entering its last days as a financial superpower. Serious commentators spoke about how a ‘Beijing consensus’ would supplant the ‘Washington consensus’. America looked as if it would disappear in a vortex of debt. Fast forward to this year, and a funny thing has happened to American influence — it’s unbowed. The very suggestion that America may be strong enough not to need quantitative easing sent global financial markets into spasm last week. If America was coming off life support, then the subsidies for all kinds of financial packages would end. As one financial strategist told the New York Times, ‘The Fed isn’t just the US’s central bank. It’s the world’s central bank.’ This point was not lost in Britain, where government borrowing costs surged. It’s said that when America sneezes, Britain catches a cold. But even as America gets better, Britain can remain ill. For those in Britain who are constantly told that the crisis ‘started in America’, this must all look rather strange. If the crash was an American disease, then shouldn’t Uncle Sam be worst affected? How come the US is now free of bailed-out banks, having sold them at a tidy $25 billion profit, when Britain looks like it will be saddled with zombie banks for another decade? And given that the Obama administration has spent the last few years deadlocked with a bickering Congress, how have the obstacles to growth been removed so quickly? Well, for one thing, there are some constants to American power. Its healthy demographics fuelled by immigration, geographic security, a syncretic, dynamic popular culture, and excellence in higher education and innovation are unchanged. As in previous slumps, private sector and public sector adjustments have triggered a revival in American capabilities. And this can be traced to the fact that it responded to the shock of the 2008 financial crisis more adroitly than its rivals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States has actually been deleveraging from the bubble years of the past decade. Yes, millions of households were in foreclosure in America three years ago — but taking the pain then has allowed recovery now. While commentators have focused on rising government debt, US households and companies have been tackling their own. According to the OECD, the debt-to-income ratio for American households has fallen from a pre-crisis 137 per cent to 116 per cent by the end of last year. That figure is now lower than European household indebtedness. Britain is at 160 per cent. It is true that government debt has soared under Barack Obama — but that is consistent with the successful path that Scandinavian countries pursued in the early 1990s in response to their own credit bubbles. State spending propped up these economies while voters paid off their debt, and then the resurgence in private-sector demand allowed governments to balance the books. This appears to be happening now in the United States. The US federal budget deficit has declined more dramatically in the past three years than at any time in postwar history. The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit to fall to 2.1 per cent of economic output by 2015 — an astonishing turnaround from the 10.1 per cent figure four years ago. By the same year, Britain’s deficit will still be at 6 per cent of GDP — the highest in the western world. American manufacturing is also on a roll. Contrary to perceptions, US factory output has been robust and productive — the problem was that it had been haemorrhaging jobs over the past few decades. No longer. Manufacturing might never be the jobs engine that it was a century ago — but it will not be a drag on job creation either. Durable goods manufacturing has added more than half a million jobs over the past three years. The intriguing question is whether this trend can continue. A 2011 Boston Consulting Group study argues it can, given that China is not quite the cheap workshop it once was (with rising wages and an appreciating yuan). The ‘rebalancing’ that Brits hear about is happening in the US, with up to three million jobs expected to be created in the next few years. The optimism felt by American factories is easy to explain. Energy costs have plunged. The development of hydraulic fracturing, or ‘hydro-fracking’, has sent gas prices to less than a third the level charged in Europe — quite some factor if you’re an energy-hungry manufacturer wondering where in the world to locate. Time after time, the answer to this question is: America. There has long been talk in the US about ‘reshoring’, where US companies decide to create jobs in the rustbelt states that need them most. But all sorts of companies are coming to America. Voestalpine, an Austrian steel company, declared in March that it would build a €550 million plant in Texas, having rejected 16 other sites in seven other countries. With an economic recovery comes geopolitical clout. Late last year the International Energy Agency projected that by 2020 the United States would supplant Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer. By 2030, the United States would realise its longstanding dream of energy self-sufficiency. And while the US government can hardly be credited with the fracking revolution, the Obama administration did not bar its progress — more than can be said for many European governments, some of which are so wedded to the renewables agenda that they don’t want to accept the good news. In fact, the drama on Capitol Hill has diverted attention from the recovery underway in an America which is not connected to political wrangling. As Larry Summers once put it, ‘The great mistake of the gridlock theorists is to suppose that all progress comes from legislation and that more legislation consistently represents more progress.’ Even so, the US system of government has been surprisingly nimble despite its perceived political paralysis. In the five years since the financial crisis, Congress has passed legislation that saved the US financial system, rescued the car-making sector, enacted the largest fiscal stimulus programme in the world (which contained substantial tax cuts), overhauled its financial regulation, passed ambitious health-care legislation, and then took steps to control spending. This week, the House and Senate are moving forward on comprehensive immigration reform. Compared with Britain — or anywhere in Europe — the US has been a hive of productive political activity. By contrast, the emerging Brics, who were supposed to take over the world, have seen better days. Brazil is confronting massive protests from citizens angry that so much money is being spent to prepare for the World Cup. Russia’s energy boom is tapering off; Moscow finds itself starved of foreign capital due to the caprice of President Putin. China’s economic growth during the Great Recession has far outstripped the United States; and yet its new leadership is rejecting the ‘Beijing consensus’ as quickly as it can. Indeed China may be heading for its own credit crunch: in recent weeks, its bank lending rates have surged and one bank briefly defaulted. The country’s attempts to clamp down on the misallocation of cheap credit may well have triggered its latest bout of financial turmoil. There is no denying that the relative power of the United States is less now than it was a decade ago. And yet, five years after the start of the Great Recession, US power does not appear to be on the wane. If anything, the trendlines suggest the opposite. Even Arvind Subramanian, the author of Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, has changed his tune a bit. In a recent paper he paraphrased Mark Twain, concluding: ‘Reports of the decline in American economic power appeared to have been exaggerated.’ Plenty of dangers lie ahead. The United States could get trapped into another draining war in the Middle East. Partisan bickering in Washington could block any structural budget reforms and cripple America’s long-term finances. A premature end to quantitative easing, or another eurozone crisis, could induce another setback. But the United States has a remarkable ability to right its own ship. That ability, in and of itself, is one of the sources of its enduring power.

**No transition wars**

**Parent 11**—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that **there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument**. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. **Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them.** Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone** than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to **cushion the impending Sino-American transition**. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

**Liberalismf ills in without unilateralism**

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For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas--such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power--are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model."

But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, **the liberal international order is alive and well**. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. **China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.**

Indeed, today's **power transition** represents not the defeat of the liberal order but **its ultimate ascendance**. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order--benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and **they have deep interests in preserving that system.**

In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system--the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession--**the liberal international order has no competitors**. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence **are creating new constituencies for it.**

## Mexico

### 2nc – no incentive

The market prevents effective implementation – businesses have no incentives to resolve disease related issues such as malaria, fever, and other diseases that affect developing nations – That’s Spieler

### 2nc – coevolution

**Co-evolution solves spread—that’s Achenbach. Every new disease brings with it new apocalyptic descriptions of its lethality, but their authors ignore science—diseases co-evolve with humans in order to survive—our immune systems build resistance and new anti-bodies. Diseases in the future won’t be worse because our bodies will be infinitely more prepared**

**Mutations don’t increase spread—increasing lethality decreases infectiousness**

**Adam 5** (Mike, Staff Writer for Newstarget.com, "Why the bird flu virus is less deadly but more dangerous," June 21, http://www.outlivetheflu.com/why-the-bird-flu-virus-is-less-deadly-but-more-dangerous.htm, AD: 6/30/09) jl

If you're a really deadly virus -- like Ebola, which kills 90 percent of the people infected -- then you're actually not very good at spreading from one person to the next. Why? You kill your host too quickly. You're so deadly that your host dies before you get a chance to be infectious.

In order to be a pandemic, a virus must be highly infectious; it must be able to spread from one person to another in an undetectable way. When a virus becomes less-immediately lethal, it is able to survive in the host in an undetectable state, for a longer period of time. This is what makes viruses really, really dangerous: A dangerous virus is not lethal to one individual; rather, it can exist in a hidden state and be passed from one person to the next. It's the contagiousness of a virus that makes it dangerous.

Let's say you're a virus and you consider "success" to be wiping people out. Obviously, viruses don't have that sort of thought process, this is just a way to explain their strategies. If you're a virus and you're trying to infect and kill people, you're going to be far more "successful" if you have a low kill rate but infect a billion people, rather than having a very high kill rate and only infecting 10 or 20 people. If you are a very deadly virus in the Congo, for example, and you manage to wipe out a small village, even though you were rather horrifying to the village and fatal to those people, you as a virus haven't been very successful. Why? You wiped out the village; there's nobody left to spread it. Now, again, of course viruses don't think this way: They don't have plans, they don't have strategies -- this is just evolutionary biology in play.

On the other hand, let's say you are a virus with a very small kill rate -- you only kill one or two percent of your hosts -- but you're highly infectious. You, as this type of virus, can easily spread from one person to the next. Since 98 or 99 percent of the people who are infected with you won't die from it, they can walk around cities, airports and football stadiums and spread you to all the other hosts out there. If you are that kind of virus, you're going to be a lot more "successful" in spreading.

In the history of infectious disease, the most deadly viruses, in terms of the total number of people killed worldwide, were highly infectious, not necessarily highly lethal. If you look at the 1918 so-called "Spanish" flu (which really wasn't from Spain, but that's another story), the virus did not have a kill rate anywhere near 90 percent, or even 70 percent. I believe it was well under 20 percent. But this virus was good at spreading from one host to another, which is what made it extremely dangerous.

**Humans will always adapt**

**Gladwell, ‘99** [Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 29]

In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. they are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact, they begin to accommodate each other. Human populations slowly build up resistance to circulating infections. What were once virulent infections, such as syphilis become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults, such as measles and chicken pox, become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.